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FOREWORD 
The writer of the following thesis has kept one 
objective constantly in mind. This objective has been to study 
South Africa 's history in order to have a better llllderstanding 
of her present problems ~nd conse~uently the possibility of 
discovering a surer basis for their solution~ 
In view of this purpose no attempt has been made to 
present anything like an eY~austive history ·of the country. 
That has been done elsewhere. Here the historical narrative 
has been sketched only for the s2..ke of placing before us the 
more important events in which the present problems of South 
Africa are grounded. 
Neither is it expected that this paper is any final 
pronolmcement upon the problems which it treats in its last 
chapter for it is only as one comes into actual contact vli th 
problems of any nature that he comes fully to understand them 
and to ·appreciate their difficulties and their possible solu-
tions. Yet . thei"e is an advantage in viewing the foe from a 
distance in order that when one does actually meet him he may 
not be trucen wholly unawares. There is also a broadness of 
vision which distance enables one to attain . .P.J.1.d these are all 
that we can at present hope to attain. 
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A. Physical Geogr aphy. 
CHli..PTER I 
GEOGRAPHY 
The British posse s sions in South Afric a constitute a 
6reat wed.ge-shaped piece of territory driven int o t he southern 
encl of the continent. However, the Protectorate of British 
s outhwest Africa, formerly German Southwes t Afric a , and the 
Nyasaland Protectorate which lies bet·ween n orthern Rhod.esia and 
Lake IJyasa are not includ.ed in what is technically knO"wn as 
British South Africa.(l) The latter territory is a v a st area 
of approximately 1, 205,000 sq_uare miles lying betv,reen the lati-
o (J 
tudes 8 S ancl 35 S. Politically it is made up of Northern and. 
Southern Rhodesia; the Bechuanaland Protectorate; Svmziland; 
Basutolancl; and the Union of South Africa which is divid.ed into 
the provinces known as the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, 
Natal, and the Cape Colony. Throughout this paper practically 
all of OU2' attention will be elevated to these four provinces. 
As a rule British South Africa is high-lying , only 
the narrov; coastal pelts being below 1500 feet in altitude . 
Yet there are no great mountain ranges. The highest points are 
in the southeast, on the DraJcensberg range, where the edge of 
the eastern escarpment reaches 10,600 feet.< 2 ) A great in-
terior plateau is the most importfu~t feature of the sub-
continent. This is generally flat althoush it is broken in 
(1) Oxford SUrvey of the Britis~_ Empire, Vol. 3, p. 1. 
Ox ford: Clarendon Press, ~14. 
{2) Ibid., p . 3. 
• 
• 
places by the ratheT abrupt ri s ing of worn remnants of hills. 
One of the outstanding portions of this :plateau is the great 
Kalahari Desert which is, properly speaking, no clesert at all 
since it supports a fairly thick sod and occasional bush . 
The larger part of the Kalahari is in t he Ilechuanaland J)rotect-
orat e. 
There are several other physico- geographical divi-
sions of the plateau of which the most important have been the 
Transvaal Highveld and the Upper Karoo. The former of the s e 
tVTo contains the Witwatersrand ·with its gold and is the most 
i mportant and p·o.pulous part of the Transvaal . The latter 
region embraces the Kimberley diamoncl mines as well as a large 
amount of land which is very suitable for agriculture especial-
ly when irrigat ed. In fact, irrigation and scientific methods 
of farming are beginning to change the degree of importance of 
the various portions of South Africa so that the agricultural 
secti ons are coming more and more into prominence . 
This interior plateau is drained by the Orange, Vaal, 
Limpopo , and Zambezi rivers and their tributaries . l.Iany of 
these tributaries ar e dry rivers such as are found in the 
Kalahari. 
The Cape Ranges, or Folded Belt , on the extreme south 
consist of mountainous tracts roughly parallel to the coast. 
Many of the valleys in this region are very rich and populous 
since there are good irrigation facilities which mru(e f arming 
profitable. 
Along the coast is a narrow belt of low co1111.try . 
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This is widest on the west and in the north of Natal and Zulu-
land. The coastline itself is peculiarly regular there being 
but few headlands or bays. In fact Saldanah Bay situated about 
sixty-five miles up the west coast from Cape Town is the only 
good natural harbor in South Africa , the others being more or 
less artificial.(l) 
B. Climate and Vegetation. 
It is said that the rainfall and vegetation of 
British South Africa are as regular as the coast. This is, in 
a sense, quite true. Part of this is explained by the fact that 
rainfall has a greater effect than soil on the vegetation. If 
there is sufficient moisture in the ground an abundant growth of 
one sort or another will usually spring up. 
With the exception of the Cape coastal region the 
country gets its rain from the Indian Ocean with_the monsoon, 
precipitation decreasing from east to west and from south to 
north. Thus the vegetation also occurs with considerable reg-
ularity, being in the order of savruL~ah , scrub, and desert. 
The annual rainfall in these regions is widely different. It 
ranges from an average of forty inches on the coast near Durban 
to three-tenths of an inch at Vlalfish Bay. Yet there are ex-
captions to this rule. Portions of Zululand and Swaziland have 
annual amounts of about fifty inches while in the mountainous 
Cape district of the' southwest of the Cape Province the annual 
(1) Op. cit., p. 28. 
3 
fall is over two hundred inches.(l) 
The seasonal rainfall varies somewhat . A small area 
in the west e~d south has its rainy season in the winter months 
while a still smaller area, along the coast between ]I:Iossel Bay 
a~d Cape St . Francis and stretching inland to Uniondale in the 
Southern Karoo, gets its precipitation scattered throughout the 
year. But most of the country is subject to a summer rainfall. 
The latter region gets a great many severe thttnderstorms . Hail 
is not at all uncommon and is so severe at times as to make 
fruit growing in Natal, the southeast of the Transvaal , and 
especially in Kaffraria a very precarious occupation . ( 2) Snow 
is liable to occur in places exceeding three thousand feet in 
altitude. It is rare along the low coastal flats but is common 
upon the mountains during the winter months from Harch to 
September, and sometimes even into December. 
Naturally under these seasonal rainfalls drought is 
very common in the interior and much of the vegetation is either 
of a specially drought resistant sort or else is short lived, 
springing up and bearing seed during the ·wet months. Wherever 
4 
there is sufficient moisture, as in the south coast forest region , 
( 1) Op. cit. , p. 56. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that 15 to 20 
inches of rainfall is the minimum under favorable seasonal dis-
tribution for average farming where the mean summer temperature 
is about 65" F . and 20 to 25 inches where the mean is 75 ° to 80"F. 
Soil texture and temperature have much to do with the rainfall 
reQuired . Thus 20 inches annual rainfall in North Dakota is 
eQuivalent to about 30 inches in southern Texas . (A~ricultural 
Yearbook! 1924. Washington, D. C.: Govt . Printing 0 f1.ce. 
:PP . 480- 81.) 
(2) Ibid. , p. 62. 
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the growth is luxuriant. 
The average monthly temperatures in South Africa vary 
but little betvveen the hottest and coldest months, the greatest 
variation being 28. 7° F at Fraserburg in the 1\forthern Karoo . ( 1) 
Temperatures of 100° F are QUite common and occasionally they 
get as high as ll5°F in the shade of' the low valleys of North-
ern Rhodesia. Yet the mean average temperature of this same 
country is only about 70°F. Mean shade temperatures of 32°F 
and under are a very common occurrence during the months of 
June, July, and August particularly over the lrorthern Karoo , 
the northeast of' the Cape Province, and :parts of natal . Severe 
frosts capable of' freezing standing water occur QUite freQuent-
ly in the interior. These greatly interfere with fruit growing . 
Yet on the whole the temperatures of South Africa are quite fa-
vorable to agricultural and horticultural pursuits. The great-
est climatic difficulty to these occupations i s the irregular 
distribution of the rainfall. Like great :portions of our own 
country much of the land can be made of value only as it is 
irrigated. 
C • Agriculture • 
We have just pointed out that much of South Africa is 
well adapted to farming especially if it is irrigated. Yet it 
is only very recently that the country has begun to realize her 
agricultural possibilities. But since she has begun to realize 
( 1) Op. cit. , p. 53. 
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them she has been going for~;vard by leaps and bounds until only 
the nai ve mind novr conceives of her as :primarily a land of gold 
and diamonds. It is said that no country in the world, Denmar k 
not ex cepted, ha s advanced its agricultura l status i n the s ame 
degree in s o short a time. Yet this advance has only just be-
g11.n . With Government aid in irrigation, disease control, and 
the lik e the south of Africa still has before it a most glowing 
f uture as an a gricultural com1try, a f uture ·which vrill keep i ts 
luster long after its gold and diamonds have lost theirs. 
Yet all this does not mean that South Afric a will be-
' 
come a Garden of Eden for the mere aslcing. It will take work. 
The prospective agriculturalist in that country will do well to 
remember the terse comment of Colonel Henrich Du Toit who, re-
ferring to that oft repeated maxim that "the farmer is the back-
bone of the nation11 said, "The backbone has two ends, one where-
with to think and the other on vvhich t o sit. His success as a 
farmer will depend upon which of the two ends he employs the 
mo r e" . 
He can here give only a most summary statement of the 
f a cts of the development to which we have referred. Previous 
to the outbreak of the Horld War South Africa, exclusive of 
Rhodesia, vms importing food stuffs at the rate of a round 
6,500 , 000,!_ annually. Her :population was then nearly 6,000,000. 
Today t~ere are 10,000,000 people in South Africa and yet f or 
the yea r ending June, 1925 she exported at least 25,500,000! 
sterling worth of products of the l and after supplying her ovvn 
people. While these figures are not exactly :parallel yet .t hey 
6 
• 
• 
do show that there has been a tremendous growth in agricultural 
production . A great many specific illustrations of this growth 
might be founcl but we will here give only two or three. 
In 1910 South Africa had to import corn (lmovm in 
that country as maize) to meet its bare reg_uirements . Two 
years later it was not yet among the principal exports of the 
Union. However, by 1918 the eXIJOrtation of corn and corn meal 
from the Union was over 2,262,000l(l) while in 1923 it had 
reached the high mark of more than 3,300,000!5 2) In 1924 this 
export suffered a radical lovvering in value but it is safe to 
say that it was not a typical year. 
~~ excellent illustration of the pomological growth 
of the country is afforded by the follovdng g_uotation . "The 
growth of the fruit export trade from South Africa is the most 
spectacular development in the post-war trade of the Union. 
Before the Boer Vlar the shipments of deciduous fruit which were 
made ·were largely experimental. In 1902-1903 as many as twenty 
thousand cases were shipped in one season; in the year follow-
ing the Union two hundred thousand cases; and in 1922-1923 over 
one million cases of deciduous fruit left, for the first time. 
The growth of the citrus industry has been even more rapid . 
Almost negligible before Union, the export during the 1925 sea-
son was more than nine hundred thousand cases."(3) 
(1) The Statesman ' s Yearbook. London: Macmillan & Co., 
1921. p. 222. 
(2) Ibid., 1926 . p . 235 . 
(3) The Organization of Fruit Export . Round Table magazine. 
No . 62. p. 418. 
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The cultivation of sugar cane has also -experienced a 
steady increase durin€,._ the last few years. A quotation on this 
. /// 
subject from the Oxford Survey -of the B.r~ tish Empire rw.1.s as 
i follows: "In 1907 the output of sugar from the Natal planta-
tions was returned at 35,000 tons; in 1911-12 the crop had in-
creased to 90,000 tons, and with the opening u:p of the rich 
alluvial sugar lands of Zululand it is more than possible that 
the :planters will soon not only supply the entire sugar con-
sumption of the Union (which amounts to approximately 130,000 
tons) , but will have a surplus for whi ch an outlet will have 
to be sought in the markets of the world11 .(l) This prophecy 
has been fulfilled. In 1923-24 203,360 tons of sugar were 
manufactured in South Africa, 28 , 500 tons of which were ex-
ported to Great Britain. .knd still the production of the 
country is swiftly increasing so that the estimated 1924-25 
crop ·would yield 225,000 tons of sugar. (2 ) 
The newest exploit is in the field of cotton culture . 
In fact this little :plant bids fair to surpass the sugar cane 
in importance. It is much more drought resistant than con1 or 
tobacco and is replacing them in parts of the Union . In 1923 
the yield of cotton in the Union alone was 3 , 674 tons , C3 >--and 
the industry was not yet five years old. 
A multitude of other facts might be cited relative 
( 1) O:p. cit., lJ. 108. 
(2) Sugar magazine. Vol. 28, No. 1. Jan. 1926. p. 31. 
( 3) Colonial Office List. London: Vlaterlow & Sons, Limited. 
19}!5. :p • . 357. 
8 
to the agriculture of South Africa . In 1924 she exported over 
15,700,000! worth of wool,(l) some of it over-topping the very 
best Australian tops. The other chief agricultural exports 
are butter and butter substitutes, corn, corn meal, cotton , 
fruit, hides, meats , mohair, ostrich £eathers , skins, sugar, 
tobacco , wattle bark, and wines. 
This great increase in agricultural production is 
due to the innovation of modern farming methods into the fields 
of the once self-satisfied and easy-going Boers together with 
the co-operati on of the Government in matters too great for the 
farmer to solve for himself. Thus the financial and technical 
aid rendered by the Union Government to the farmers in the 
matter of irrigation alone totaled 1,027,084! in 1923-24 and 
803 , 8551 in 1924-25.( 2) Likewise, the Government has taken 
steps to stamp out certain prevalent stock diseases which have 
caused tremendous losses in the past. Again, the transporta-
tion problem is always one of paramount importance in any 
agricultural country, and especially in any fruit growing 
country. Today in South Africa the problem of fruit transpor-
tation is a pressing one. Yet on the whole, considering the 
sparseness of the population, the railroads are handled very 
satisfactorily by the Government and afford an efficient method 
of getting produce from the interior to the ports or the cen-
ters of consumption. 
(1) Statesman's Yearbook, 1926. p . 235. 
(2) Ibid ., p. 233. 
9 
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A few agricultural schools have been founded though 
there is a sad need for more of them. The future of South 
African agriculture is going to be largely dependent up on these 
present institutions and upon the Government in extending the 
system , increasing its efficiency, and in solving the new prob-
lems which will continually arise as the industry grows in age . 
Al~d the future of South African agriculture will largely de-
termine the future of South Africa itself. 
D. Mining and Industry. 
We are merely repeating an old story when v'!e say that 
South Africa was first made famous by the discovery of diamoncls 
near Kimberley in 1871, that fame to be crowned by the dis-
covery, in 1884, of gold in the conglomerates of the Witwaters-
rand. Since that time the mention of South Africa has al·ways 
suggested these two precious objects to the mind . .And the gold 
and cliamond mining industries still remain the chief ones on 
the list although several other minerals are now being taken 
from the earth. The chief of these are coal, copper , tin, and 
silver. The f ollowing tables give some idea as to the relative 
size of the various mining indus tries t ogether with the aggre -
gate value of their minerals. 
10 
• 
Total Mineral Production.(l) 
Union of South Africa . 
Total Production r~) 
December 31, 1924. 
Union of South Africa. 
Year 
1920 ----------
1921 ----------
1922 ----------
1923 ----------
1924 ----------
Va.lue in 1 
66,773,790 
52 , 257,828 
38,972,246 
52,987,663 
58' 670,843 
Mineral 
Gold -------
Diamonds ---
Coal -------
Copper - ----
Tin --------
Value in 1 
835,654,765 
236,238,832 
64,877 , 804 
23,897,961 
5,109,579 
Grand •rotal 1,165,778,941 
Percentage of Labor Employed in Mines in 1924.(3) 
Union of South Africa. 
ining Industry 
Gold --------------------------------
Diamond -----------------------------
Coal --------------------------- -----
Ba8e Mineral ------------------------
Others ------------------------------
Per cent. 
68.96 
15.23 
12.04 
2.64 
1.13 
It will be seen f rom the above statistics that gold 
mining is much more important than all the others :put together 
both in value and in the amount of labor employed.. The gold 
11 
:production for 1924, excluding the :premium, amounted to 
40,672,4471, an advance of 1,833 , 7361.( 4 ) The 1925 production 
:promises to be a record :provided the ore maintains its richness. 
The ore crushed during the firs t half of the year was 186,141 
tons in excess of the amount for the corresponding period of the 
(1) Statesman 's Yearbook, 1926. :p. 234. 
(2) Ibid., :p. 233. 
(3) Ibid., p. 234. 
(4) E. G. Thompson, The Mines of South Africa. In the South 
Africa Annual. Cape Town: Horter's Limited . 1925. p. 71. 
• 
• 
previous year while the increase in gold output for the same 
period was 80,080 ounces. There was also a marked increase in 
the production of several other minerals in 1924 over 1923. 
The most outstanding of these were diamonds which rose from 
6,038,207! to 8,029,466l.(l) Coal, osmiridium, copper, and 
tin showed improvement. South Africa also produces quantities 
of arsenic, antimony, lead, manganese, asbestos, chrome, co-
rundum, graphite, iron pyrite, magnesite, mica, and mineral 
paints. 
The latest discovery, and one which ma,y lead to an 
industry which will supersede gold mining in value, is that of 
platinum. The Transvaal promises to become the greatest plati-
num producing country in the world, possessing a potential 
platinum belt of over two thousand square miles. The principle 
deposits are thought to be in the Lydenburg and the Waterburg 
districts. But since the mines just began to operate the first 
of 1926 it is still impossible to tell what will be the results 
of this project. 
The above figures have applied only to the Union and 
it should be remembered that the other parts of South Africa 
also produce considerable quantities of both precious and base 
minerals. The chief of these sections are in Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia. The latter had a mineral production of 
12 
4,300,6251 for the year 1923 which was a slight decrease from 
the preceding year. But in 1924 it reached the 4,478,4991 mark, 
(1) E. G. Thompson, The Mines of South Africa. 
• 
• 
a slight advance on the 1922 figures.(l) In Northern Rhodesia 
gold, copper, zinc, and lead are mined while coal has been 
discovered. The total mineral production for 1924 was over 
3,330,0001 or nearly 300,0001 in advance of 1923. Little min-
ing is done in Swaziland though its mountains are said to be 
rich in deposits. But so far the chief production has been 
that of tin, 241 tons having a value of 59,082! being mined in 
1924. This was a radical increase over the preceding year. 
The history of mining in South Africa is long and 
interesting. It is far from being completed. The whole 
country has large deposits, especially of base minerals, which 
a r e as yet untouched. And undoubtedly, as the recent discovery 
of platinum has shown, there are many deposits of enormous 
va l ue which are not only untouched but are also still undis-
covered. Even at present the mines produce a great share of 
the exports though they now have a rapidly growing rival in 
agriculture. 
We can here do little more than present some of the 
problems which face the mining industry at present. Natur ally 
one of the greatest problems of any such enterprise is that of 
labor. In 1924 there were a total of 305,946 persons employed 
by the mines of the Union of Sou th Africa. Of these 274,018 
wer e either native, coloured, or asiatic, the remaining 31,928 
being white.( 2) The majority of the non-white employees are 
natives. In February 1924 their number was 183,764 while t he 
(1) Statesman's Yearbook, 1926. p. 220. 
(2) Ibid., p. 234. 
13 
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following February it was practically the same, being 184 , 037. 
But it is one thing to hire a nat ive to work and it is alto -
gether another thing to keep him on the job. Thus by the end 
of June,l925 12,391 of these laborers had been lost by the 
mines . The preceding year the loss over the same :period was 
slightly in excess of 8,000. This di f ference is to be ac -
counted for by the fact that the season 1924- 25 was a bumper 
one for crops and the natives therefore had less need to work 
thRn during the former year. The native disinclination to 
work when it is not absolutely necessary together with the 
Government restrictions now :placed upon the obtaining of native 
labor from the Portuguese :possessions are two of the -main 
difficulties in the way of the mine operator. Labor becomes 
of a constantly fluctuating character. This means that the 
native seldom stays long enough in the mine to become really 
efficient at his job. 
Another great :problem, and. one :perhaps more difficult 
to solve than the :phase of the labor situation to which we have 
just referred , is the reduction of operating expenses. As the 
ores become less rich it is altogether necessary that high 
efficiency in their handling be attained . American and Aus-
trian engineers have helped greatly in attaining this so that 
in some of the Transvaal gold mines working costs were reduced 
14 
in 1924 by 5d. per ton while profits rose from 9s . 5d. to 10s.3d. 
:per ton . However, this reduction has not been universal and 
some mines are struggling _along operating only for the sake of 
the employees and commercial firms and not at all in the inter-
ests of the shareholders. In 1924 no less than twelve gold mines , 
employing 28 pe~ cent of the :fl.'uropean labor , declar ed no d.i vi -
dends. ( l) 
The other main problem of the mining industry is in 
connection with the Government . In the Union there are large 
deposits of arsenic, antimony , asbestos , chrome , corundum, 
mica , and talc which can be worked successfully only with state 
assistance and guidance. There is ample market in the world 
for the s e base minerals but the great :problem is to get them to 
the market in a unifo r mly graded condition. Thus a law com-
pelling the grading of these minerals is sorely needed . A Bill 
dealing with the subject has been drafted but the pressure of 
other legislation has kept it from being placed before Parlia-
ment. Perhaps we could do no better in presenting the need of 
Government co - operation with the mines than to give the report 
of a Government Committee headed by Sir Robert Kotze , the Gov-
ernment Mining Engineer , whi ch made an exhaustive investiga-
tion of the situation in 1924. It recommended the following 
measures: 
"A more sympathetic policy in the matter of railway 
rates. 
"Financial relief in favor of known but undeveloped 
resources, by avoiding the taxation of capital devoted to 
supplies and eQUipment , and of working costs . 
11 AmendmAnts to the Gold Law to facilitate :prospect -
ing . 
"Taxation of the mineral industry on the basis of 
the net revenue only . 
":Provision of more effective means of inq_uiry and 
n.ssistance through the extension of the economical functions 
of the Geological Survey, the Government Mining Engineer's 
Branch , and the Industries Division by the addition of staff , 
and the general co - ordination and broadening of effort. 
"Special efforts to develop the gold , coal , and 
(1 ) E. G. Thompson , The Mines of South Africa. 
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iron industries , in view of their outstanding importance, 
actual and potential . 11 ( 1) 
Since the World War South African ma.nufacturing in-
dustries have experienced a very satisfying growth . The 
impetus was given them by the War . .A :para.graph taken from 
the Oxford Survey of t he British Empire runs as follows: 
11 In manufacturing industries South i' .. frica h a s 
achieved no great results . From the meagre statistics of 
:production available it would appear that the approximate 
value of the output of manufactures is 20 ,000 , 000 sterling. 
\ 
This is made up for the most pa.rt of the production of a, very 
large number of small scattered factories and workshops , 
numbering between 2000 and 3000. In very few· cases does the 
value of the combined :production of any single industry reach 
1 , 000 , 000 sterling . Such , however , are corn- milling , sugar-
refining , manufacture of explosives , bread , biscuit B.nd con-
fectionery works , brevveries , and printing; these a lone 
represent e. total annual output of over· 9 , 000 , 000 sterling, 
leaving the remaining 11 , 000 , 000 or 12 , 000 , 000 to be divi~ed 
in varying amounts among th~ minor industr i es . H( 2) 
It will be remembered that this survey was published 
in 1914 . Since then there has been much development. The 
industrial census of' th'= Union in 1923- 24( 3 ) showed that the 
value a.dded by :process of manufacture is now nearly 40 , 500 , 0001 
( 1 ' 
- ) 
( 2) 
~uoted from E. G. Thompson , The Mines of South Africa. 
Ibid ., ll • 121. 
(3) Statesman's Yea rbook , 1926. p . 233 . 
16 
• 
while the gross vg,J.ue of the production of industry is over 
79,500 , 0001. A total of 7,112 factories ma.de returns. In 
these 182,877 persons were employed, 66 , 189 of which "'rere 
white. Thus it is seen that while manufacturing industries 
use much less labor than do the mining industries yet they 
use more than twice as much white labor as do the mines. The 
cl asses of factories which reported in 1923- 24 were as fol -
lows: Food , drink, &c.; Metals , engineering , &c . ; Chemicals; 
Heat , light, and power; Clothing and textiles; Books , print-
ing, &c.; Leather , &c . ; Stone, clay , &c.; Vehicles; Furni -
ture, &c. 
Outside of the Union Southern Rhodesia is next in 
manufacturing importance. She has several successful cream-
eries and bacon factories , a few cotton ginneries, and an oil -
expressing plant. 
Of course south Africa is still rightly considered 
to be mainly a producer of raw materials . Nevertheless, she 
is now manufacturing en ough to supply many of her own demands. 
The 1923-24 figures show an increase of 83 factories , 10,830 
employees, and over 3,000 ,000! value added by :process of 
manufacture above the 1922-23 figures . 
E. Communications and Commerce. 
The :principle method of communication between the 
coast and the interior is by means of Government owned rail-
roads. The motor vehicle is only slowly making its way i nto 
Africa. 
However, Basutoland h"is fair roads for any kind of 
17 
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transport although she has only 16 miles of railway.(l) By the 
close of the year 1922 Southern Rhodesia had 2468 miles of 
railway(2) while Northern Rhodesia had the trunk line of the 
Rhodesian Railroad running from Livingstone to the . Congo bor-
der.(3) However, because of the nature of the 0ountry communi-
catione in Northern Rhodesia are very poor. The cost of road 
building is almost prohibitive so that railroads are about the 
only solution aside from the limited aid given by th~ navigable 
rivers . Swaziland has no railways at all though i t enjoys 
about 250 miles of good motor road besides some roads of poorer 
g_uali ty . The Bechuanaland Protectorate has a. little railway 
track. 
The Union provinces are pretty well supplied with 
modern methods of tranRportation and communication. They have 
over 11 , 000 miles of Government railroad together with over 
600 miles of privately owned l ines . (4) The Gover nment roads 
are a fruitful source of revenue and at the same time give ex-
cellent service to their patrons. Thus the one from Johannes-
burg to Ca:pe Town covers the thousand miles of irregular going 
in 29 hours . It is second to none in the Empire , not even 
"the vaunted Trans-Canada on the Great Pacific Limited . " 
The greatest difficulty with state ownership is that 
every little village has its :political :pull which draws a 
branch line out of the system to satisfy its whims. Many of 
these branches run perhaps one train a week. Never in the 
18 
(1 ) Statesman's Yearbook, 1925. p~ 216 . 
( 2) Ibid . , p. 221. 
(3) Ibid., p . 222 . 
(4) Ibid. , p. 236. 
• 
world will they pay for themselves . 
The whole of South Africa is fairly well connected 
with telegraph lines and even the telephone is becoming not un-
common as the country goes . Postoffice s are freg_uent, at least 
as frequent as the centers of white settlement . There are now 
practically 3000 of them in the Union alone.(l) At many of 
these money- orders may be cashed and at a greater number they 
may be purchased. 
19 
Along the coast there is good water communication 
especially between the :principle ports ,- - Cape Tovm , Simons town , 
Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London , and Durban. The fol -
lowing table will give some idea as to the volume of shipping 
carried on by the South African ports . 
Oversea 
Tl 
CoA.stwise 
IT 
Maritime Shi:pping . ( 2) 
Union of South Af rica , 1924. 
Shipping 1924: entered 
-
1 , 293 vessels 
II II cl eared 
-
1,240 IT 
IT II entered 3,080 IT 
If If cleared 
-
3 ,0 94 H 
Net tons. 
of 4 , 980 t 295 
rr 4 , 737,717 
II 7 , 762 , 011 
11 7,945,103 
Still in spite of all this modernization and volume 
of transport we would not dare to leave the subject without 
at least stating the fact that a great deal of the travel in 
South Afri ca today is on foot , on horseback, or in carts . 
The Union exports a large amount and varie ty of 
mineral and agricultural products . Its imports consist mainly 
(1) Statesman's Yearbook, 1926. p. 236. 
(2) Ibid. 
• 
of manufactured articles such a s certain foodstuffs, clothing, 
and mining machinery. For the year 1924 the exports of the 
Union were valued at slightly over 84,500,000!.(l) The United 
Kingdom , the Empire, artd the United States were her chief 
customers. Her imports totaled nearly 66,000,000!.{ 2) Both 
exports and imports show a substantial increase over those of 
the :preceding year and it !V'ill be noticed at the s ame time 
that the balance of trade is in the Union ' s favor. All this 
is in spite of the fact that her population is constantly in-
creasing, and that this increase is mostly in the ranks of u..n-
skilled labor. 
Southern Rhodesia is the other great exporting and 
i mporting country. For the year 1924 her imports we r e 
4 , 054,5021 and her exports 5,564,7161.(3) Of the latter 
2,394 ,6011 was raw gold. Next in order were asbestos , copper , 
corn , chrome ore , animals, and t obacco. 
F. Population. 
I n as much as problems of population ar e the most 
critical ones now facing South Africa we will here give only a 
very summary statement as to its numbers and distribution.. In 
later chapters we will treat these matters more in detail.(4) 
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At present the inhabitants of this land may be divided 
(1) Statesman's Yearbook , 1926. p. 235. 
( 2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid., p. 221. 
(4) Chaps. II , VI , and especially VII. 
• 
• 
into two general groups, · European and non-European. The latter 
group is made up of several components: natives, coloured 
people, and Asiatics. 
The natives are principally of three races: the 
Bantu, the Hottentot, and the Bushman. Of these the Bantu are 
by far the greatest in number. We will describe the natives 
in Chapter II. 
Associated with the natives but much fewer i n number 
are the so-called coloured people, or "Cape Boys 11 as they are 
sometimes named. They are largely the product of Boer f'ather s 
and Hottentot mothers. However, there is apt to be the blood 
of any of the inhabitants of South Africa running in their 
veins . 
The third group of non-Europeans which we mentioned 
is not numerically so large but at :present it is playing a 
most important role in the Union. It is almost completely 
composed of I ndia!.l.s. We shall discuss this Indian Problem 
later.(l) 
The Europeans are :principally of two extractions, 
British and Dutch. They form the most important facto r in the 
government and both the Boer and the English languages are 
official. Yet, while there is plenty of friction because of 
this duality thei r ideals and methods are becoming more and 
more amalgamated. The di f ferences within the European camp of 
South Africa are becoming more and more political rather than 
racial. 
( 1) See p. 94. 
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The last complete census of the Union was taken in 
1921. 
Cemms Report 
Political Division 
Basutoland(l) 
Bechuanaland(2) 
Northern Rhodesia((3)) 
Southern Rhodesia 4 
Swaziland( 5) 
Union of So.Africa(6) 
Year 
1921 
1921 
1925( Mar . 31) 
1921 
1921 
1921 
Europeans Non- Europeans 
1 , 603 
1 , 743 
4 , 424 
33 , 620 
2 , 200 
1,519 , 488 
497 , 178 
151,240 
1 , 106 , 534 
c.770 , 000 
131 , 363 
5, 409 , 0 92 
In the case of the Union this shows an increase of 
over 700 , 000 coloured :people and natives in the decade 1911- 21. 
A similar incre a se has occurred in most other :parts of British 
South Africa. Moreover, this is all out of :proportion to the 
European rate, which is far below it. 
Herein lies one of the great problems confronting the 
Government of the Union . I s European control about to be 
eclipsed by the "rising tide of colourn? The thought of such a 
~ossibility has generated a :panicky state of mind among some of 
the European population . Thus Colonel Du Toit has estimated 
that by 1950 the non-European population will have reached an 
aggregate of 30 , 000 , 000 in the Union if it continues its pres -
ent rate of increase . But this is undoubtedly an exaggeration. 
It is even in excess of the Census estimate~ A much saner view 
is beld by the Round Table vvhich says, referx·ing to the 1921 
22 
( l) Statesman's Yearbook , 1926. p . 216. ( 4) Ibid ., :p . 219. 
( 2 ) Ibid . , :p. 217 . ( 5) I bid ., :p. 223. 
( 3) Ibid., p. 221 . ( 6) Ibid. , p. 226 . 
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Census Heport: 
nit was calculated that, on the basis of increase 
during the preceding ten years , and ass~ming that there was 
no great white immigration, the population in 1974 would be 
3 , 650,000 ~uropeans as against 24 ,000,000 coloured, Asiatic , 
and Bantu . But this was a very long projection of an al -
together inadequate baseline . It was admitted that, on the 
basis of the preceding thirty years , the figures would be 
6 ,500,000 to 16,500,000. Even so, one vital fact seems to 
have been lost sight of. Europeans have been counted care -
fully since 1891; Bantu , who today form 4,698,000 out of the 
5,409,092 non- Europeans most certainly have not. They were 
adequately dealt with in 1921 alone . Previously they had 
been confessedly underestimated. It is very questionable 
whether , in view of the high death- rate , the tide of color 
is rising so swiftly after all. Certainly it has not risen 
very abruptly in our factories. In 1915-16 Europeans were 
to others as 1 is to 1.55 ; in 1922-23 they were as 1 is to 
1.80."(1) 
Nevertheless the problem is a serious one . More 
and more the natives and other non- Europeans are driving the 
white man from the ranks of unskil led labor. The situation 
would be the same in the case of skilled labor were it not 
for the recent passage of the Color Bar Bill . 
I n view of the se facts it is worthwhile to take a 
little closer view of the population of the Union. Of the 
23 
(1) The Color Bar. Round Table , No . 60 . Sept ., l925 . pp . 833- 834 . 
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colored population in 1921 of 5,409,092 4,697,813 were Bantu, 
165,731 were Asiatic , and 545,548 were of other r a ces. From 
1911 to 1921 the total increase in population was 15.99 per 
cent. The increase in European populat ion was 19.06 per cent 
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and that of other races 15.16 per cent. The proportion of 
Europeans to the total population in 1921 was 21.93 per cent.(l) 
Among the non-Europeans the 1921 census showed that 
there were 2,400,000 with no religion. This of cours e takes no 
account of the religions of savagery. The largest religious 
group was the Wesleyan which embraced 730,022 persons. The 
report also showed the presence of 109,261 Hindus. The rest 
of the non- whites were distributed among several other world 
religions. ( 2) 
One more group of statistics should occupy our atten-
tion for a moment. We refer to those prosaic town census fig-
ures. Outside the Union there are almost no cities of great 
importance. But within the Union there are several of pretty 
good size. Six of these, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, 
Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, and East London, have, according to 
the 1921 census, over 20,000 white inhabitants. Seven others 
contain over 10,000 whites. Of the first six Johannesburg has 
a tota l population of 288,131, Cape Town of 207,404 , and Durban 
of 14.6,310, while nine other cities domicile over 35 , 000 souls 
each.(3) Undoubtedly these figures are now somewhat larger· 
(1) Statesman's Yearbook, 1926. p. 226. 
( 2} Ibid., p. 227. 
( 3) Colonial Office List, 1925. p. 352. 
since there has been a considerable influx of whites in par-
ticular into the towns during the last few years. Together 
with this must be considered the natural increase and the 
growth due to immigration. 
While the figures that we have given above mean 
little just as figures yet they will serve us well later as 
a mechanical basis for our study of the present problems of 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NATIVE SOUTH AFRICAN 
There are three native races in South Africa which 
will engage our attention in this chapter. Yet none of these 
three are indigenous to that territory. It is not known just 
who were the indigenous peopl~s. But of the native races now 
living there the Bushman , the Rottentot, and the Bantu are 
the most important. In fact, we might do little harm by leav-
ing out of consideration the first two of these so insignifi-
cant are they in both present and potential importance. 
A. Bushman. 
The Bushman is probably the oldest extant race in 
Africa. There are grounds for belief that the Mediterranean 
coast and the Nile Valley were once occupied by a dwarfish 
race of Bushman type before the Caucasians settled there.(l) 
But when the Dutch came to South Africa they found these 
little people scattered over the region south of the Zambezi. 
In fact there were two or three varieties of "Bosjesmen" as 
the Hollanders called them. 
The characteristics of these people are QUite uni-
form. They are about five f'e.et in height both men and women 
being of the same stature. Normally the skin is a dirty 
yellow with a faint undertone of red. The slope of the face 
is much the same as that of our own and, while the skull is 
(1) Johnson, Sir Harry, Race Problems in the New Africa. 
Foreign Affairs , Vol.2, No.4. June, 1924. p. 601. 
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small and low in the crown yet, the ratio of its breadth to its 
length is greater than that of the other African races. It is 
more nearly European.(l) One marked feature of the Bushmen is 
that they lack the characteristic negro odor . However, they , 
especially the women, are burdened with an astonishing, almost 
grotesque, growth of fatty tissue on the calves of the legs and 
the buttocks. This peculiarity marks them even at some distance. 
The Bushma.n' s hair is wooly and of a rusty brown color which 
turns to grey in age. I t grows in tufts on the scalp. This 
"peppercorn" growth is also characteristic of Negroes and Bantu . 
Bushmen are nomads of the wilderness. They have hard-
ly any social organization, industry, dwellings, or clothes; 
their weapons are very primitive. The latter consist of a short 
bow ~nd horn or iron tipped poisoned arrows, an iron knife, and 
a knobkerrie. The workmanship on these is most crude. They 
keep no animals except an occasional dog. 
Nevertheless these people are unsurpassed as trackers 
and also in their practical knowledge of woodcraft . They are 
not cannibals , -- their taste is much coarser than that would 
permit! Vfuen nothing else is at hand they are not at all averse 
to a meal of snakes, mice , insects, berries , or roots. 
Yet these Bushmen are more or less of musicians and 
artists . Using white , red, black, and yellow :pigments they 
paint pictures on the rocks which retain their freshness for 
centuries. 
Because of their nomadic life in sma.ll, sea ttered 
{1) Willoughby, W. C., Race Problems in the New Africa. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923. p. 25. 
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groups missions to the Bushmen are impossible. Not much is 
known of their mental or spiritual life although it is certain 
that they have an elaborate mythology and some sort of re-
ligion.(!) Their language is largely monosyllabic and is not 
related to the Bantu and only remotely to the Hottentot. It 
supposedly contains no numerals above three . It is harsh 
sounding, consisting mostly of guttera.ls , aspirates, and clicks. 
This race of people are apparently soon to be extinct 
although their blood is being preserved in the veins of their 
neighbors. They are now of little political importance and are 
confined largely to the lower half of the Orange River , the 
Kalahari Desert , Lake Nagami, and the Okavango River . 
B. Hottentot. 
Associated with the Bushmen at least in territor ial 
occupation are the Hottentots . Here again we have a people 
which have come to be commonly known by a name given them by 
the European. Yet the origin of the word Hottentot is not def-
initely knO\¥n. Some say that the name is a modification of the 
Dutch word for "stupid"; T. Hahn claims that "Huttentut" is Low 
German for "quack". Yet the Hottentots have a far different 
idea. They call themselves Khoikhoin , which means ":people ~ 
excellence 11 .( 2 ) 
The Hottentot is five or six inches taller than the 
Bushman, is darker in skin, has a distinctly hollow back, a.nd 
lacks the extreme growth of adipose tissue on his buttocks. 
(1) Willoughby, o:p. cit., p. 28. 
( 2 ) Ibid • , p • 30 . 
• 
His hair is black rather than brown, his lips are everted, 
and 
the slope of his face is that of the Negro. Apparently there 
are Bushmen , Hami tes, and Negroes in his progeniture. His 
mental and social make-up accords with this view. "Mild , ami-
able , sociable, improvident , indolent , unstable , and very 
dirtyn(l) are these :people who live in small villages of dome-
shaped huts. They have never been agriculturalists but are 
rather herdsmen, shepherds, and nomadic hunters. They, like 
the Bushmen, have never been guilty of cannibalism. 
The Hottentot language is a :puzzle to the :philolo-
gist. The best authorities now regard it as Hamitic which has 
been influenced by Bushman.< 2) The Hottentots are supposed to 
have migrated to the s outh some time after the Bushmen arrived 
there but long before the Bantu came. They with the Bushmen 
occupied the country from Walfish Bay to the Kei River for two 
centuries after Vasco da Gama discovered the Cape. But now 
they are confined to about the same restricted area as the 
Bushmen. It has already been mentioned that their blood gives 
most of the color to the "Cape Boys". 
C. Bantu. 
As has been indicated , of the six and one half mil-
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lions of aboriginals in South Africa the Bushmen and Hottentots 
form but a negligible portion. It is safe to say that six 
millions are of the Bantu race. 
(1) Willoughby, op. cit. , p. 31 . 
( 2) Ibid., p. 32. 
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This is the youngest race of natives in ·the country 
and , unlike the other two , is prolific and. verile as a study of 
statistics and history will show. Their name , which means 
"human being" in their own language , was gi v.en them by the late 
Dr. Bleek. The origin of the race is unknown although it is 
very evidently complex. In fact , the Bantu comprise a r a ce 
only as regards social and cultural heredity , their physical 
characteristics being markedly diverse . At least part of these 
peoples migrated from central Africa by way of the east coast, 
supposedly intermarrying with the Phoenician , Arab , and Indian 
settlers on their way. (1 ) Sir Har.ry Johnson fixes the date of 
this differentiation from the negroes at about two thousand 
years ago . 
But be these facts as they may the race has no uni -
form physi cal type . Variations are found all the way from near 
Hamites with steel-grey eyes and Egyptian-like faces to tribes 
which are pronouncedly Negro in appearance . There are also 
tribes which approach the Bushman and the Hottentot types. In 
short the parallel is cl ose between t h e Bantu and the United 
States. Like us they are composed of a hopeless amalgamation 
of races , resulting in the f act that both t hey and we are with-
out a uniform physical type. Like us they are unified , if we 
can get the right sense o£ uni f ied , only by their type of 
mores. Of course this parallel cannot be carried too far nor. 
too rigidly , f or the Bantu has·not yet risen from the tribal 
stage and has no more than a tribal consciousness while we are 
(1) Willoughby , op. cit.,pp . 3 6-39 . 
Oxford Survey of the British Empire , Vol . III , p . l45 . 
• 
far beyond that point. 
The chief characteristics of the Bantu are their 
tribal organization, their language, their religious sense , 
their knowledge of agriculture, their institution of polyga-
my, and, in the east coast tribes , their instinct f or war. 
Let us take a passing glance at some of these items for the 
help that it may be to us in understanding the native problem 
in South Africa. 
The tribal organization is one under paramount and 
lesser chieftains with a communal responsibility for crime 
and a communal system of land tenure. While they have their 
assemblies wherein each adult male shares more or less of the 
responsibility yet the chief is the one ultimately looked to 
for authority. Can we not see in this political organization 
some of the reasons why the Bantu of' today shirks personal 
responsibility and appears faithless to the average European? 
The majority of them are like irresponsible children who have 
yet to develop a full self- consciousness. 
It may be well to add here that over half of these 
people live on native reserves and, except for a hut or poll 
tax and an occasional bit of missionary activity, are practi-
cally untouched by any other civilization than their o~~. 
ost of the other Bantu are situated as native squatters on 
either private or Grown lands , their position being much like 
that of the mediaeval serf . There they have their own land 
and retain their own social institutions in return f or which 
they give two or three months labor a year on the private do-
mains of their "lord", or else pay a small rental fee. In 
31 
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this condition they receive only a very limited contact with 
Western civilization. The few remaining Bantu work a s private 
servants and the like in the homes and ind.ustrial institutions 
of Europ eans . Of course they begin to take on European cus-
toms. But partly because of their lack of feeling of persona l 
responsibility and partly because of the impatience of their 
white employers with their natural slowness of mind and body 
these natives do not often attain to any balanced degree of 
Europe an culture. The result is that they go swiftly from one 
employer to another and engage in occupations which are not a t 
all coherent with their capabilities, were they trained. Thus 
it is not uncommon for strong , full -grown men to act a s house-
maids and in other equally absurd capacities. Because of these 
facts the natives gain little from contact with Western civi -
lization save its vices. The European would do well to re -
member and practice the teaching of I mmanuel Kant who struck 
the key-note of civilization when he proclaimed that no man 
should ever be used as a means only, he should also be treated 
as an end in himself. Treat the native Afri can as an end in 
himself and , like any child who must be educated, he will cost 
you much money and patience at fi rst but he will soon doubly 
repay you. In dealing with him one must remember that he has 
for centuries been steeped in a tribal concept and an ethical 
atmosphere which is far di f f erent from our own . 
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Turning to the language of the Bantu we find that it 
is inflected mainly by prefixes and is dependent upon the har-
mony of sound. Sir Harry Johnson gives examples of 226 distinct 
dialec~s to be found among the fifty million Bantu living in 
• 
Africa. Some of these are no farther apart than our ovvn dia-
lects of New England and Alabama while others are cons iderably 
beyond the border s of mutual intelligibility . Philological 
study , however , shows them all to be of one origin. The Euro-
pean is gradually writing a literature for the Bantu but · :prev i-
ous to his advent all the folklore was :perpetuated orally . 
In religion the Bantu carries his tri bal concept in-
to a spiritual realm. Thus his worship is mainly that 8f the 
spirits of the dead , who have power to precipitate either good 
or evil upon the tribe. ~olitical and religious practices are 
hopelessly intermixed . The Bantu has not the problem of hav -
ing a state within the state , f or him there is but one state; 
practically every act is of some religious signi f icance. Yet 
this is not so far removed from the ph ilosophical ideal. 
The ethi cal code of the native is appallingly low. 
Still he has a code to which he is faithful . 
A great deal might be said about the remaining 
charac teristics of this child-race but it is not our purpose 
to do it here , save to mention one fa ct . The Bantu is agri -
culturally minded. This asset may be his salvation in the 
fa ce of the white hordes. He is abl e to settle do~.rn to rather 
intensive farming on small plots of land. The Bushmen are 
nearly extinct as a race. 1 ~hy? Because they are a nomadic, 
non- agri cultural , hunting people . Likewise the Hottentot is 
being submerged largely f or the same reason. Perhaps the best 
illustration in this f ield is afforded by the American Indians. 
But the Bantu, unlike these other peoples, has shown himsel f 
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adaptable to the agricultural and industria l systems of the 
white man . Conseq_uently his extinction is improbable if not 
impossible. He is destined to :play an ever larger part in 
the history of his country . 
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CHAPTER III 
SKETCH OJi" SOUTH AFRICAN COLONIZATION PREVI OUS TO 1814 
A. European Background. 
For centuries men as individuals and groups of men 
as nations have been in a great struggle for existence. Its 
vicissitudes compose the pages of history while its reQuire-
ments have led to the discovery of new lands and the expansion 
of civilization. Of course, some additions to our knowledge 
are the result of simple curiosity but it is safe to say that 
by far the larger portion of them proceed out of conscious and 
de f inite ef fort directed toward a speci f ic goal. The goal may 
not always be reached but occasionally something more precious 
is discovered by the way. So it was with Bartholomew Diaz who , 
intent on discovering a sea route to India, was turned back in 
despair only to report to his king that he had discovered Ca bo 
dos Tormentas ("Stormy Cape"), little realizing that thi s was 
really the Cabo de Boa Esperanza ("Cape of Good Hope") not 
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only because it was the hope of reaching India but also because 
it was the hope of a new and marvelous land. 
There was a reason f or the discovery of South Africa. 
We have already intimated it in part. It was not mere human 
inquisitiveness , f or even in those times men were not willing 
to risk their lives far just for the sake of going where no one 
had gone before. The experience of Columbus and Diaz with their 
crews was proo f of this. Had not conditions in Europe liberated 
the forces of the Renaissanc e it is very probable tha t these 
• 
discoveries would not have been made at this time, or for some 
time to come. 
But Europe was in ferment, or rather she was just 
beginning to orient herself after a long mental relapse due to 
the barbarian invasions. The Revival of Learning had come 
largely as a result of a renewed contact with the East which 
in turn had been made by the Crusades . There was war between 
the Moslems and the Christians for the domination of the west-
ern world; there was · trade rivalry between the Italian cities 
and the other ports of Europe which was sure to result in 
victory for the former as long as Europe faced the East and 
had to reach India by a partial land route; there was a grow-
ing conflict between the ideas of a decrepit old age and those 
of a new one which was just struggling for expre s sion. 
Gradually the Moslems had to give way to the Chris-
t i ans and each find their ovm place; the Medi terranean ports 
had to yield to those of the Atlantic seaboard; and the hallu-
cinatory intellectual shadows of the Dark Age s were dispelled 
by the prying rays of light from a new and critical age. 
The discovery and exploration of South Af r ica was 
one of the incidents in this process. A settlement was event-
ually established on the Cape to afford a watering and resting 
place for ships on their way to and from India and the East. 
Only slowly did the nations begin to realize that South Africa 
had any intrinsic value. 
36 
• 
B. The Early Exploration of South Africa . 
It is common to think of the Portuguese as being the 
first explorers of South Africa and so far a s modern history 
goes they were. However, there is a lmost irrefutable evidence 
that the east coast was :pretty well known to the ancient Egyp-
tians and Arabs . The unique stone buildings in the neighbor-
hood of Sofala in what is now Portuguese East Africa bespeak 
the onetime presence of civilized inhabitants in that section . 
It is even thought that Solomon obtained s ome of the gold for 
his temple fr om this region, while the Greek historian , 
Herodotus , rec ords the account of an expedition sent out by 
Pharaoh Ne cho about 600 B.C . which in three years time circum-
scribed Africa starting from the Red Sea and anchoring at last 
at Sais on the Nile.(l) 
But so far as we are concerned today it was Pr i nce 
Henry of Portugal who gave the impetus to African expl oration. 
He fitted out many expeditions with the apparent purpose of 
findi~g a sea route to India in order that the valuable East-
ern trade might be taken from the Moslems and also that the 
Moslems themselves might be attacked fro m the rear, for rince 
Henry's brother was a prisoner of the Saracens and the Pri nce 
had a desire for revenge . Thus in a sense the discovery of 
the Cape of· Good Hope was really an incident in the last 
Crusade . 
It was Bartholomew Diaz who, in August, 1486 , set 
(1) Purchas ,S., Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His F ilgrimes. 
Glasgow : James MacLehose & Sons, MC1fV . Vol.VI. :p. 507. 
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sail from Lisbon and after an eventful.voyage returned to the 
same port in December, 1487. He had succeeded in rotUlding the 
end of Africa , touching Moss el Bay and Algoa Bay , a.nd getting 
into the currents of warm water from the Indian Ocean. Then 
his men refused to go farther and he was forced to return home. 
On the way back he sighted the Cap e of Good Hop e , or the Cape 
of Storms, as he called it. 
The nex t adventurer of importance was Vasco da Gama. 
Leaving Lisbon the middle of the year 1497 he touched at St . 
Helena's Bay , Mos sel Bay, the Limpopo River , a.nd Mozambique , 
and from thence s a iled on to Calcutta sighting the coast of 
India on the 16th of May , 1498. His return was by the same 
route. In 1502 he made a second voyage. In 1503 _ntonio da 
Saldanah landed at Table Bay and in 1510 the Viceroy of !'ortu-
gu.ese India , :Francisco d'Almeida, landed at the same :point and 
met death at the hands of the Cape natives. 
Due to this and other incident s the Southern coast of 
Africa ac g_uired a reputation among the :P ortuguese of being 
stor rrjj, barr en , and inhabited by f ierce and unruly people . 
They conseq,uently let it alone from the Kingdom of Angola in 
38 
the ongo region on the west to Sofala on the east, never at-
tempting t o colonize below the present site of Lo r ence Marq,ues 
at JJelagos. Bay. The Island o:f St. Helena and occ as ionally the 
Ca:pe of Good Hope were used as refreshment stations. Thus Port-
ugal had discovered South Africa and had shown its importance 
as a ba~is f or ports of call on the new route to the East , but 
it remained for other peoples to take possession of the land 
and discover its real i mportanc e. 
• 
C. The Cape Colony to 1814. 
The new route to India· having been opened, English, 
Dutch, and French ships followed the Portuguese. Table Bay 
was used by all these fleets as a refreshment :place but it was 
not until 1620 that the country was definitely claimed for any 
na tion, save that in 1486 Diaz had erected some stone crosses 
bearing the Portuguese coat-of-arms at points along the coast. 
However, in 1620 Captain Andrew Shillinge in command of a 
small flee t of f our ships entered the Bay and on July 3 hoisted 
the English flag on the Lion's Rump and, in the presence of his 
own crews and that of a Dutch merchantman then at anchor in the 
harbor, claimed. the land f or the King of England. But nothing 
came of the event for the home Government took no action to 
make good the claim. 
It was not until twenty-eight years later, 1648, that 
a Dutch East India Company's ship, the Haarlem by name, was 
gr ounded in the Bay. The crew got safely to shore and salvaged 
practically all of the cargo. It was at the beginning of the 
rainy season and after erecting a few shacks for protection 
they prepared a large plot of ground and planted it to garden 
truck. The success was phenomenal and they lived on an abund-
ance of fresh vegetables. Moreover , the neighboring Hottentot 
tribes came to pasture their large herds of' cattle and sheep 
on the coastal plain. Barter with these people was inaugurated 
and the shipwrecked crew was supplied_ with a seemingly inex-
haust~bl e supply of fresh meat. Thus South Africa appeared to 
them to be a virtual Garden of Eden. 
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Upon being .carried home in a returning Dutch fleet 
Leendert Janssen and Nicholas :!?root, two of the Haarlem's 
officers, presented to the company a document in which they 
heartily espoused the idea of establishing a station at Table 
Bay . The Committee of Seventeen which controlled the Company 
finally decided that such a move would be advisable and in 1651 
three vessels sailed from Texel to found the colony. Mr . Van 
Riebeek was in charge of the enterprise; all of the colonists 
were in the direct empl oy of the East India Company. 
Such was the course of the events which led to the 
establishment of the colony which was to open up South Africa. 
It is not our purpose here to trace the intricacies of the 
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development of this colony and subsequently of the others which 
sprang from it in one way or another. This task has been ade-
quately done in other works.(l ) However , we may note a few of 
the outstanding facts of this development and f i nd , i f possible, 
the origin of some of the forces which have helped to make 
South Africa what she is today. 
It was the idea of the East India Company to make the 
Table Bay station a sort of relief hospital and supply :port for 
her o~~ ships , although trade with the crews of ships from 
other countries was not to be prohibited. A hospital was to be 
erected and a supply of fresh meat was to be always on hand, 
while the colonists were to prepare a great garden and grow all 
kinds of vegetables. Thus the scurvy smitten crews would have 
(1) See Bibliography. Professor Theal is the recognized au-
thority on South African history. He has several other 
more extensive works not listed in this bibliography. 
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a place to recover from their disease and many lives and much 
misery would be saved . It was a fine plan in theory and it 
did not work out so badly in practice although the colony was 
invariably a rather heavy drain on the Company's resources • 
So expensive was the project that it was necessa ry 
to find a way to reduce the cost of maintenance. Consequently 
the directors decided to grant plots of land to those of its 
hired servants who cared to accept them, to set them up in 
business for themselves, and then to buy their produce. Thus 
the produce would cost no more while the Company would be re -
lieved of the support of the producers. In 1657 nine of the 
employees took their discharges and were granted plots of 
ground near the settlement. This was the beginning of the real 
Cape Colony. 
The next year slaves were introduced and here we find 
the source of several tendencies which have not yet died out. 
One was the crossing of these with the natives , and with the 
whites , to help propagate the coloured persons who are so 
common in the Cape. Another was the placing of manual labor 
below the level of the white man. It became the "nigger'sn 
job. The third tendency which was accentuated by the intro-
duction of slavery was the simplification of the language, re-
gardless of the rules of grammar, to the point where it cou ld 
be understood by the slaves and by the natives. Here we see 
the beginning of the Boer or Afrikaans language. 
At the same time Asiatics, criminals from Malacca, 
Java, and the Spice Islands, were also introduced by the East 
India Company as slaves. These were freed after a certain 
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length of service. They were a much more educated people than 
either the Hottentots or the Negroes and this fact complicated 
matters. Although they helped to add to the complexity of the 
coloured people yet they retained their distinctness to a very 
considerable degree and formed the root of an Asiatic problem 
in South Africa. 
However, the colony grew rather slowly. It was hard 
to induce settlers to go to the country since there was con-
stant danger of raids by natives and by wild animals. Then 
Holland was being continually embroiled in wars and there was 
danger that the Cape would be siezed by the English. And 
moreover , little was known of the settlement outside of its 
own bounds and.of the ships which visited it. 
It was not until 1672 that the land was formally 
bought fr om the natives and then it was at a scandalously low 
price. The whole territory from Saldanaa Bay to False Bay was 
purchased for the consideration of 91 12s. 9d. worth of goods 
al though the natives understood that the purchase price was 
1' 6001.. 
About this same time trouble was brewing between the 
native chief, Gonnema, and the colonists. This precipitated 
the Second Hottentot War in 1673. Its consequences were im-
portant. I·t made evident the fact that the natives could not 
be depended upon to furnish a constant supply of fresh meat 
which was necessary in order to f ulfill the mission of the 
station. Thus it became imperative f or the Europeans to breed 
their o~m stock and the Company made enticing offers to those 
vvho would risk the venture. Slowly the industry was dev eloped 
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and the origin of the Boer stock breeder and farmer was wit-
nessed. Now it was necessary to constantly push out f arther 
and farther into the wilds to obtain :pasture. 
Subsequent to the Edict of Nantes in 1598 there was 
a great influx of Huguenots into South Africa , that is , it 
was great in comparison to the number of white settlers al-
. 
ready in the country. There were a total of 176 who came dur-
ing this period and they were a valuable asset to the colony 
f or while they were :penniless yet they were of high intelli-
gence and considerable skill. Gradually they became absorbed 
by the :Dutch and even their language was lost. 
The government all this time was conducted by the 
East India Company. In fact this organization was so strong 
that it practically ran all Holland at times. r A gove,t1or was 
appointed for the colony and a council of the eight highest 
of ficials in the country regulated public matters. There 
were courts of justice in which the burghers had some partici-
pation. Churches were established as were also schools. 
In 1713 and again i n 1755 the Cape was attacked by 
terrible scourges of small - pox. These wiped out colonists, 
slaves , and natives by the hundred. Many of the Hottentot 
tribes were practically obliterate~ . This had little effect, 
however , except to solve some of the native problems for the 
colonists who survived. But even this effect was not perma-
nent for in 1779 came the First Kaffir War which was followed 
by eight others do~~ to 1877 when the last one broke. 
The way in which the colon~ was ruled varied so~e­
what with the character of the gov{nors who were sent to it. 
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lhile the East India Company was strong it had many opponents 
and it was forced to administer its possessions with more or 
le ss justice. But by 1790 it was tottering to its fall and 
all hands were trying to support it. The government of the 
colony then became very corrupt and little action could be se-
cured to remedy matters. Public expenditure was exceeding 
revenue by 92 , 0001 a year and much of this was being wasted. 
By increased taxa tion and other methods the annual deficit 
was brought down to 27,0001 but even this drain could not 
long be stood by the Company i n its sickly condition. Then 
in 1793 came disruption in· the homeland and war with England. 
Yet it was not until two years later that an English f leet 
was fitted out to occupy the Cape. The colony could present 
but a feeble defence and yielded to the British forces under 
General Craig. British occupation began September 16, 1795. 
This was to be but a temporary occupation. Promises 
were given by the British to administer affairs justly and in 
some respects these promises were carried out . Yet the new 
'>(' 
gov~nor was harsh and all did not go smoothly. Professor 
Theal points out that the Dutch and British were too nearly 
alike to get along well together. It was only human that each 
should overem~hasize the slight peculiarities of the other and 
that jealousy and ill-feeling should ensue. Moreover there 
was the indisputable fact that the DutQ were a con~uered 
people and this consciousness on both sides did not tend to 
lessen the friction. 
At last came the Peace of Amiens in March , 1802 and 
the Batavian Republic was formed. The Cape Colony was signed 
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over to her by the British and in February, 1803 a Dutch garr i-
son of three thousand men replaced the English and the Batavian 
commis s ioner, DeMist, took charge of affairs. The colonists 
r allied to his support and this had a restraining influence 
upon the hostile native tribes who thought that the government 
must be stronger now. But this was not to last f or long for 
Dutch rule in South Africa was prac.tically at an end. England 
was about to acQuire a colony which has since proved of great 
value, a colony which had grown from its little beginn i n g in 
1652 to have a population of 25 ,000 or 26,000 Europeans, exclu-
sive of soldiers , in 1805. These owned about 30,000 slaves 
and had in their service about 20,000 free coloured people. 
Cape Town alon e had a popula tion of over 6,000 Europeans and 
11,000 coloured people.(l) 
In May, 1803, less than three months after the Bata-
vian Government had been set up at the Gape , war again broke 
out between that power and Great Britain. The Colony pre-
pared to resist attack but it was almost hopeless . In 1806 a 
fleet of sixty-three ships came against it and on the lOth of 
January of the same year the articles of capitulation were 
signed. According to their terms private property was to be 
unmolested by the conquerors but all government property was 
confiscated. The paper money in circulation was guaranteed 
legal until the pleasure of the King should be known. The 
colonists apparently had little reason to complain save that 
they were again a conQuered people. 
(1) Theal, G.M. , South Africa. p. 132. 
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Yet the rule tightened down as it had before although 
the ~arl of Caledon who had be en appointed gov~or was a very 
just and upright man . · One important measure which he took was 
to divest the Hottentot chieftains within the colony of their 
power and make all the natives who had been under them subject 
to the Colonial Government. This prevented much lawlessness . 
Another of his important moves was to establish a circuit 
court . 
At last , in 1813 , the French under Napoleon met 
serious reverses a.nd the Prince of Orange returned to the 
Netherl ands from his exile in EnglF.,nd and was accepted as ruler 
of his people. In August, 1814 an agreement was signed in 
London which ceded the Cap e Colony along with some Tiutch 
possessions in South America to England. The period of Dutch 
control in South Africa was over . 
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CH.A.P TER IV 
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
FROM 1814 TO THE BOER WAR 
A. The Cape Colonl· 
The colonists felt keenly their separation fro m the 
Batavian Republic and their a11nexation to the :Sri tish Empire. 
They had been ardently attached to the Republic and n ow all 
that they could see was the dawn of another era of arbitrary 
rule such as they had suffered from at the hands of the Brit-
ish during the period between 1795 and 1803. 
Lord Charles Somerset was the first Governor sent 
out by England after ~he cession of the Colony in 1814. He 
was greedy for money and he and his assis t ants lived high, 
consuming over.a q_uarter of the entire revenue of the country. 
Moreover, he was harsh in some of his dealings and only a 
little more than a year after his arr i val aroused the ani-
mosity of the Dutch settlers by his treatment of the prisoners 
taken during Slachter's Nek Rebellion. 
In 1820 an important event occured in South Africa 
which has had a lasting effect upon the country. Because of 
the distress in England caused by the unrest and unemployment 
following the Napoleonic Wars it was suggested that the Im-
perial Government aid emigration from the British Isles to 
South Africa. Applications representing nearly 90,000 persons 
soon carne in and in Mar ch, _ 1820 the firs t of the immigrants 
were landed at Algoa Bay. By May , 1821 nearly 5,000 of these 
English immigrants had. arrived. 
47 
• 
48 
They were first settled on :plots of ground which they 
were to own after three years oc cupation . But these Englishmen 
were artisans, not f armers. This fact combined with the re-
:pea ted clestruction of thei r wheat crops by rust , the stealing 
of their cattle by t h e natives , and other discouraging events 
drove most of them to the villages and tovms where they found 
ready emploj~ent as artisans in thei r various trades . Grahams -
town and Port Eli zabeth were both settl ed by the 1820 i mmi-
grants . 
The presence of these Engli sh-speaking people brought 
f orward a l aw which greatly irritated the Dutch in the Colony. 
About one-eighth of the European inhabitants now spoke the 
English language and the Imperial Government proceeded t o make 
it the off icia l lang~age. By January 1, 1828 not only all 
official documents but even the proceedings of the law courts 
were entirely i n English . This was a most serious grievance to 
the Dutch. 
From this t i me forth South Africa began to hav e a 
di ff erent history. The Dutch soon began to look to the regions 
beyond the Orange River which had been made desolate by Tsha ka 
and his Zulu horde as a poss ible :place of escape from British 
rule . They could get no sympathy fr om the home Government and 
conditions grew wors e and worse for them. Conseq_uently the 
Great Trek began in 1836. Theal summarizes the causes of this 
movement as fol lows : 
"Let us look again at the grievances which de termined 
their conduct. First, there was subjection by a fore i gn and 
unsympathetic government. Second, there was the prohibition of 
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their language in the public offices and courts of l aw . Third, 
there was the superintendent of the London Missionary Society, 
their ablest ~nd most relentless opponent , in possession of 
boundless i nfluence with the British authorities. Fourth , 
there were the slanderous statements made by the philanthropic 
societies in England concerning them . Ji' ifth, there was the 
sudden emancipation of their slaves without ade~uate compensa-
tion . Sixth , there was the whole mass of the coloured people 
placed upon a political footing with them, and that without a 
vagran t act being put into f orce. Seventh, there was no secur-
ity for life or property in the eastern districts, which were 
exposed to invasion by the Kosas, as the secretary of sta te 
took part with the barbarians. Th~se were the chief causes of 
the grea t emigration , and there were many others of less im-
porta:nce . " (l) 
The above quotation not only enumerates the principle 
causes of the trek but also hints at what had been going on in 
the Cape Colony. However , the English authorities did not in-
tend to let their colonists retire from them so easily and upon 
pretense of protecting the Bantu Natal was t aken from the emi-
grant Dutch by Cape Colony forces. Natal came under British 
rule in June, 1842, after a campaign against the Dutch force 
under Fretorius. But the emigrants persisted in withdrawing 
from territory held by England , trekking from Natal t o the in-
terior. 
It was then that Sir George Napier , at the suggestion 
(1) Thea1, G. M., op. cit., p. 196. 
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of Dr. Philip , head_ of the London Missionary Society and 
·inveterate enemy of the Boers , created , in 1843 , two treaty 
states on the border of the Cape Colony. · These states were 
to b e under the nominal rule of their chieftains , Adam Kok 
and Moshesh. They were large enough to include t h e terri-
tory settled by the Dutch . Thus the Dutch emigrants were to 
be brought under Engl ish control. But the plan failed for 
Kok was but a petty chieftain whi l e Moshe sh used his :power 
to .build up a strong following which later did great d1:1..mage 
to South Africa. The Dutch ridiculed t h e idea of either re -
moving to other g_uarters or of submitting to the treaty 
chiefs . The project remedied nothing and caused much 
g_uarrelling and distress. 
I t f ell to the lot of Sir Peregrine Maitland , the 
successor to Napier , to fight the Seventh Kaffir War , 1846-47. 
This ultimately resulted in victory for the British but it 
cost enormously in money and very much more than usual in 
human life. I t did mu ch to convince the home Government that 
the Cape should. be allowed to settle its own affairs. 
While under Sir Maitland the Colony made much prog-
ress , magistrates and churches be ing increased , a fine school 
system brought into operation, municipal government intra -
duced into tovYns and villages, good wagon roads made through 
many mountain :passes, and a rapid increase in the production 
and exportation of wool effected . Ye t the war cost him his 
:position even though it had been caused by Kosa aggression. 
He was . followed as Governor by Sir Henry Pottinger who was 
also appointed High Commissioner for dealing with all matters 
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in South Africa arising beyond the borders of the Colony. 
This position was retained by the succeeding governors of the 
Cape. The war broke out again and Pottinger was replaced by 
Sir Harry Smith, a distinguished South African and Indian 
soldier. The new Governor was heartily welcomed even by many 
of the Dutch, for they had fought under him thirteen years be-
fore and had learned to trust him. One of the first of his 
acts was to end the treaty states formed by Napier. He then 
proclaimed, February 3, 1848, all the land between the Vaal 
River, the Orange River, and the Kathlamba mountains to be 
Crown territory under the name of the Orange River Sovereign-
ty. This act was taken most favorably in the Cape Colony but 
the Dutch settlers in the proclaimed territory prepared to 
fight. The battle of Boomplaats ensued and resulted in the 
defeat of the farmers many of whom now migrated across the 
Vaal river to help set up the South African Republic. 
Another interesting event of Sir Harry Smith's 
administration was the attempt on the part of the home Govern-
ment to make the Cape a convict colony. The success of this 
plan was only thwarted by the insistent refusal of the colon-
ists to have anything to do with the first convict ship which 
arrived, refusing to allow it to dock and not even supplying 
it with food. 
In the meantime the Kosas had recuperated from their 
last struggle and were ready to fight again. Consequently the 
Eighth Kaffir War began. Sir Harry Smith was succeeded by Sir 
George Cathcart who subdued the natives, concluded a peace with 
them, and established a strong government in British Kaffraria 
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(the territory between the Keiskama and the Kei rivers). 
Shortly after this Cathcart was replaced by Sir George Grey 
who sought to prevent the outbreak of another such war. But 
his efforts were hardly needed for the Kosas soon began ac-
tion which led to their self-destruction. Through the in-
fluence of one of their number who was supposed to be in 
touch with the spirit world the tribes far and near were in-
duced to kill all their cattle and consume all their wheat, 
being promised that when this was accomplished they would 
enter upon an era of ease and plenty such as they had never 
before known. This era, however, would not dawn until all 
their food was consumed. But the whole affair was illplanned 
for as it worked out some tribes were starving while others 
were still enjoying plenty. Finally, however, the day came,--
and ended in black disappointment. Instead of assembling 
the warriors in one spot to await its dawn the chiefs had left 
them scattered throughout the land so that no concentrated 
attack upon the white people was possible. A short and un-
successful attack was staged and then the Kosas fell to fight-
ing each other for even shreds of leather and roots of trees 
to stay their hunger. They perished by the thousand and only 
the distribution of food by the colonists saved any part of 
them alive. The Kosa power was destroyed ror the time being. 
This was in the year 1857. Later, in 1865, British Kaffraria 
was annexed to the Cape Colony. 
While this was going on another very important event 
had taken place. On March 11, 1852, an order in council 
granted the Cape Colony a constitution. We have noted that 
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the Seventh Kaffir War was largely responsible for this event. 
The constitution provided for two elective legislative as-
semblies which must meet every year. The franchise was given 
upon the basis of a small property qualification to all races 
and colors alike. In 1892 it was found necessary to raise 
this qualification and also to add a meagre literacy test. 
No law could be made without the consent of both houses and 
the governor. The Crown retained the right of veto but it 
was very rarely exercised. 
In 1872 the constitution was followed by the intro-
duction of a responsible ministry, an event very welcome to 
the colonists. Ten years later the Dutch language was al-
lowed in debate in Parliament thus removing much of the un-
fairness of the previous system. The Dutch now began to take 
more interest in the government. 
Since the granting of the constitution, with the 
exception of temporary setbacks as during wartime, the Colony 
has made steady progress in almost every direction. Soon 
much of the unoccupied territory was settled, agriculture was 
given a nevi impetus, exports were greatly increased largely 
due to the vast mining industries which had sprung up at 
Kimberley and in the Transvaal, missionary work thrived, new 
schools for all but university work were established and 
there was even a university founded to grant degrees upon ex-
amination, an efficient judicial system was created, almost 
every village was made to enjoy municipal government, roads 
and railroads were constructed, postoffices were established, 
two submarine cables were laid to Europe, and public works of 
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every sort were founded. 
The public debt created by all this expansion was 
considerable, being, in 1896, equivalent to 711 for every 
white colonist, a total of nearly 28,000,000!• 
An important piece of native legislation was passed 
during Rhodes' administration. It was the Glen Grey Act of 
1894. It was aimed at the race problem and was based upon 
four principles: work, segregation on native reserves~ i~­
dividual property, and local self-government. All these 
provisions were to apply to the natives. The experiment was 
eminently successful. The young men who usually spent their 
time loitering around street corners took a liking to work 
when confined on the native reserves and many of the natives 
eagerly took up the ownership of plots of ground for them-
selves. They were allowed to settle their local matters and 
this was all the self-government they cared for. They 
neither understood nor wanted to bother themselves about the 
complications of Cape politics. But under the Act the natives 
even took an active interest in education. A Select Committee 
of the Cape House reported in 1903 that "the operations of the 
Act have been, as they were intended to be, most beneficial to 
the natives concerned. Individual tenure and local self-
government have done much, and will in the future do more, to 
lead the aboriginal natives in the path of improvement." The 
Act is still in force and has formed the basis of much of the 
subsequent native legislation. 
The year 1896 was a dark one for the whole of South 
Africa. Along with drought, locusts, and runderpest came a 
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war with the Matabele and, most significant of all for the 
future, the Jameson Raid. The storm clouds of the Boer War 
were banking up on the horizon • 
B. Natal. 
We have seen that in 1836 there was a great exodus 
of Dutch settlers from the British possessions into the dev-
astated regions of the north. The first party of these trek-
kers met ill fate through dieease and at the hand of natives. 
Only a few of them escaped, fleeing to Delagoa Bay where they 
were finally rescued by friends from Natal. The second .party, 
under Hendrik Potgeiter, was larger and while it was attacked 
by the fierce Matabele it succeeded in holding its ground and 
finally united itself with other bands of emigrants. On June 
6, 1837, an assembly was held at Winburg and a provisional 
constitution adopted. There was to be but a single, elective 
legislative assembly, the volksraad. The fundamental law was 
to be Dutch and a court of landdroat and heemraden was created. 
The government was to be headed by Mr. Retief who was given 
the title of Commandant-General. 
It wa'S soon decided that it would be better for the 
new community to move to Natal than for it to remain in the 
interior. A_:fter much :fighting with Moselekatse, head of the 
Matabele, the objective was gained. In Natal the Zulu chief, 
Dingan, received the Dutch with such a show of friendship as 
to throw them off their guard. Then came terrible massacres. 
But eventually Dingan was subdued and Mr. Pretorius, who was 
now at the head of the emigrants, placed Panda in the chief's 
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position, making him subject to the volksraad. Thus this little 
band of Dutchmen had ridded South Africa of the terrible menace 
of the Matabele under Moselekatse and the Zulus under Dingan. 
They gave all the credit to God • 
The Boers now planned for the safety of all concerned 
to restrict the Bantu to certain parts. of the terri tory. This 
measure brought intervention and as we have already noted the 
English forces from the· Cape, under pretense of protecting the 
natives, seized Natal on June 25, 1842. 
This English seizure was followed by the influx of 
many Bantu tribes who had lived in fear of Panda. It all re-
sulted in more war and troubl'e and the condition of the natives 
was no better than it would have been under the Dutch. England 
had not really wanted a new colony and yet now that she had 
Natal it promised to be one of her most productive possessions. 
The soil and climate on the littoral were excellently adapted 
to the cultivation of semi-tropical crops and it was thought 
that the mountain regions would furnish a most valuable reserve 
of native labor. But the English soon found that t~e Bantu 
does not intend to do more work than he is forced to. Con-
sequently a policy which has been of great importance in its 
after effects was adopted. Coolies were imported from India 
under ten-year contracts. It was supposed that they would re-
turn to their own land at the expiration of the period. In-
stead of that many of them preferred to settle down in Natal. 
Their presence brought a steady stream of Indian merchants and 
traders into the country. The result was that their standard 
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of living was soon imposed upon the country since by the close 
of the century they were as numerous as the whites in the 
colony. 
The government of Natal was gradually broadened under 
the British till there came to be two legislative houses which 
held their seats for ten and four years respectively; the fran-
chise was such as to exclude all but British subjects and was 
gradually narrowed so as to exclude non-Europeans. 
Closely connected with Natal is Zululana. The most 
outstanding event in that country has been the Zulu War which 
was treacherously precipitated on January 2, 1879, by the Zulus 
under Cetwayo. By the end of June Cetwayo was a captive and 
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the Zulus were conquered. Zululand was not immediately annexed 
to Natal but became a British dependency with the governor of 
Natal acting also as its governor. The war had few consequences 
save to cause the change of some of the South African officials, 
break the power of a hostile tribe, and aid in the downfall of 
the Beaconsfield Ministry. The power granted to the several 
native chieftains proved a source of friction and later part of 
the land was annexed to the Transvaal while the remainder be-
came a British dependency in 1897. 
C. The Orange Free State. 
The Orange River was first crossed by Europeans in 
1760 but no permanent settlements were made in the region north 
of it for another three-quarters of a century. Then came the 
Great Trek and we have noted that some of the Boer farmers 
• 
• 
finally settled down in this territory. For some years these 
new settlers led an independent life under their own govern-
ment. However, in 1848 there arose serious disputes between 
the natives and the Dutch settlers. The excited natives be-
came a menace to the English coloni-es as well as to the Dutch 
while the Dutch were hardly strong enough to deal with them in 
a decisive manner. Consequently the new governor of the Cape, 
Sir Harry Smith, issued a proclaimation declaring the whole of 
the territory between the Orange and the Vaal rivers to be 
under British sovereignty. A British Resident was appointed 
to Bloemfontein with assistants at Winburg and Caledon River. 
Some of the discontented farmers took up arms and the Battle 
of Boomplaats ensued which, as we have already noted, was a 
decisive victory for the British. After this event part of 
the Boers trekked to the Transvaal but most of those who re-
mained were won to British rule. 
In 1852 war was started with the Basutos under 
Moshesh. Sir George Cathcart led the British forces across 
the Caledon into Basutoland the last of December only to fall 
victim to savage strategy and suffer humiliating defeat at 
the very outset. Nevertheless Moshesh followed up his success 
by a letter in which he prayed to be no longer considered an 
enemy of the Queen and promised to do his best to keep his 
people in order in the future. Cathcart, also anxious for 
peace, agreed to retire. 
The Imperial Government had long meditated upon the 
withdrawal of its sovereignty from the Orange River Territory. 
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But when it heard the news of this new Basuto war which was 
waged in protection of that very territory it immediately came 
to a decision. 
Sir George Clerk was straightway sent to the Euro-
pean inhabitants of the Sovereignty to direct the establish-
ment of a representative body which should take over the gov-
ernment. He met with strong opposition from the people who 
rebelled from being abandoned by Great Britain into the hands 
of a savage power, which Great Britain had herself done so 
much to build up. Clerk was obliged to call to his aid the 
discontented trekkers from across the Vaal and to sprinkle 
gold about with a liberal hand before he could get an assembly 
which would sign away their British protection. 
However, on February 23, 1854, a convention was 
drawn up at Bloemfontein which withdrew the British sover-
eignty, and transformed the territory into the Orange Free 
State. The following years were, in the main, peaceful save 
for serious trouble with the natives. But between the Cape 
and the Free State governments there was excellent harmony. 
A dispute over the boundaries in the diamond district was 
peaceably settled in 1876 by a convention which awarded the 
Free State 90,0001 for the surrender of its claims. In 1889 
the Free State joined the Customs Union of which Natal and 
the Cape Province were members and in the same year a Cape 
railway was built across the State to the Vaal. Thus there 
was a most satisfactory commercial and political relation-
ship between these Dutch farmers and the English provinces. 
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This was true especially during Mr. Brand's presidency. He was 
a most level-headed and tactful executive. Among other tasks 
he worked hard to keep down the friction between the British 
and his Boer friends beyond the Vaal • 
The little republic was governed by a president whose 
term of office was five years, an executive council, and a 
volksraad of sixty members, half of which retired every two 
years. 
In 1889, after the death of President Brand, an al-
liance was formed with the South African Republic. This was 
renewed again in 1897 and by action of the Volksraad on Sep-
tember 27, 1899, it was considered as binding the Free State 
to aid the Republic against the English. 
D. The Transvaal. 
Upon reaching the Transvaal the Boers found that they 
had more or less freedom from the British although they were 
never entirely free from native troubles. In a few years they 
obtained their formal freedom from the British Empire through 
what is known as the Sand River Convention of January_ 16, 1852. 
Article 1 of this Convention states explicitly that the emi-
grant farmers beyond the Vaal shall have "the right to manage 
their own arfairs, and to govern themselves according to their 
own laws, without any interference on the part of the British 
Government''. ( l) It further states "that it be understood that 
( 1) Lee, G. C., Source-Book of English History. New York: 
Holt & co., 19oo. p. 569. 
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this system of non-interference is binding upon both parties".(!) 
Friendliness and commerce were to be encouraged between English 
and Boers, there was to be no slavery in the Transvaal, no trade 
in ammunition or firearms with the natives, mutual co-operation 
of police forces and courts, and no restriction upon immigration 
from one colony to the other save in the case of debtors and 
criminals. 
Thus the independent future of the country seemed to 
be safeguarded and promising. In 1858 the three groups of emi-
grants living in the Transvaal united to form the South African 
Republic. 
But now trouble began and continued down to 1877. 
The Government failed in almost everything that it undertook 
and wasted money right and left. It also became embroiled in 
native wars which it was not powerfUl enough to manage al -
together successfully. In the opinion of the British this 
brought their own colonies into a dangerous position since the 
natives, winning victories over the Dutch, might think that 
they were strong enough to conquer the English too. As a re-
sult of this the Transvaal was annexed to England on April 12, 
1877. We cannot believe that this move was altogether dis-
pleasing to the imperial ambitions of Disraeli, . the English 
Prime Minister at that time. 
No physical force was necessary to accomplish the 
feat although many of the Boers were discontented because of 
it. It certainly was in direct opposition to the Sand River 
(1) Lee, G. c., Op. cit. 
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Convention. Two deputations of Boers later went to England to 
protest against the action of Her Majesty's Government but they 
met with no success. 'However, there is one quality for which 
the Boers are remarkable, that is dogged persistence. In De-
cember, 1880, they hoisted the flag of the Republic at Heidel-
berg and began to fight. So determined were their efforts that 
the British were eventually forced to give in although except 
for the efforts of President Brand of the Free State the strug-
gle would probably have continued somewhat longer. But on 
March 6 he managed to secure an armistice between the two bel-
ligerants. This was followed by a preliminary peace signed by 
Sir E. Wood and the Boer representatives on the 21st of the 
same month. The final treaty, the Convention of Pretoria, was 
signed on August 3, 1881 and on October 25 was ratified by a 
duly elected Volksraad. It provided that after August 8, 1881, 
the Transvaal State was to have "complete self-government, 
subject to the suzerainty of her Majesty, her heirs and suc-
cessors". Just what suzerainty in connection with complete 
self-government means it is pretty hard to tell. Perhaps the 
following provisions of the treaty were meant to define such 
suzerainty. There was to be a British Resident with all the 
, 
powers of a .Charge d'Affairs and Consul General and with over-
sight of all the natives within the Transvaal or who came into 
contact with the Transvaal. The British Government was to 
control the Republic's foreign affairs and it was further 
stated that there should be no encroachment of the Transvaal 
State into the territory beyond its borders as delimited by 
the Convention. Swaziland was fully recognized as independent. 
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These were the most important provisions of the thirty-three 
articles. 
However much the British may have mistreated the 
Republic it is certain that the Boers did not live up to the 
Pretoria Convention. There was constant trouble on the Bechu-
analand border where Transvaal freebooters were attempting to 
gain new territory. The Republic did not restrain them and 
the trouble was not settled until Rhodes took a hand in it and 
secured the intervention of Britain. 
Out of this trouble came a new treaty which was 
signed on February 27, 1884. This was the London Convention 
and was much shorter than the previous one. It made possible 
the continuance of a British Resident though it neither ex-
plicitly stated his powers nor establi.shed him in the Republic 
at that time. It reaffirmed the independence of the Swazies, 
relinquished direct British control over the natives but in-
sured their protection, and explicitly stated that treaties 
other than those with the Orange Free State must be approved 
by the Crown of England. Stress was also laid upon the fact 
that the borders of the Transvaal should not be extended be-
yond those set by the treaty. 
Some of the English considered this convention 
supplementary to that of 1881. However, the word suzerainty 
was omitted and the Boers held that the London treaty had 
superseded the earlier one at Pretoria. Thus at last they 
felt themselves to be free from British domination. This was . 
proper for it seems strange that if the London Convention was 
originally intended to be but an amendment to that of Pretoria 
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that the fact was not explicitly stated in one of the arti-
cles.(l} 
But once again the Boers did not live up to their 
agreement. Trouble continued in Bechuanaland; there was trek-
king from the Transvaal into Zululand where a new republic 
was established which was later, 1888, incorporated into the 
South African Republic; in 1890 Rhodes had all that he could 
do to stop a trek into Rhodesia and succeeded in allaying the 
ambitions of the Boers only by diverting their attention to 
Swaziland which was finally declared a protectorate of the 
Transvaal in 1894. 
But we have shown only one side of the government 
of the Republic. During this period there were also serious 
tariff troubles and strained relations between that state 
and the Cape Colony. Then too, disastrous trouble was com-
ing to a head within the Transvaal itself. 
In 1877 when the Transvaal was annexed by the British 
it was in a state of bankruptcy. Then came the discovery of 
gold within its borders. By 1885 the revenue from the Rand 
mines was 177,8771 and by 1898 it had reached 3,329,9851. 
. - -
This source of revenue speedily put the country on its feet 
financially and even made it appear prosperous. But the pro-
ducers of all this wealth, which totaled nine-tenths of the 
revenue of the Republic, were mostly Englishmen, called 
Uitlanders. Toward these men the Boer Government acted in a 
most exasperating manner. It considered them to be but 
( 1) See pp. 69-70. 
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transient fortune hunters. This was undoubtedly true in a large 
number of cases but nevertheless the great city of Johannesburg 
had been established and that was bound to supply a goodly 
number of permanent settlers.(l) But even to the cries and 
petitions of these President Kruger and his Dutch Volksraad 
turned a rather deaf ear. From 1890 to 1894 the granting of the 
franchise was so restricted as to make it almost impossible for 
even the ordinary immigrant to obtain it. Besides this griev-
ance there was considerable abuse by the Administration in the 
granting of monopolies and concessions. Then in 1894 the Uit-
landers were commandeered to fight the natives. The next year 
the drifts by which trade entered the Transvaal from the Cape 
were closed by action of President Kruger. 
This was almost too much for Cecil Rhodes who was 
then Prime Minister of the Cape. Consequently he came to the 
decision that a rising of the Johannesburg people was the only 
solution for the problem. Negotiation with President Kruger 
had resulted in almost complete failure. So Rhodes very fool-
ishly began to plot such an uprising. It culminated in the 
Jameson Raid which was disastrously ended with the defeat of 
Jameson at Krugersdorp on January 2, 1896. The whole affair 
was mismanaged and too l ong drawn out to be successful and at 
last Jameson, yielding to his impatience, exploded things by 
plunging across the border from Bechuanaland with an entirely 
insufficient force of six hundred men. Rhodes tried in vain 
t o stop him. 
(1) See p . 71. 
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The raid temporarily co.st the Prime Minister his posi-
tion and his reputation. It also helped to give the Boers a 
confidence in their superiority over the British which was to 
cost dearly in human life three years later • 
President Kruger offered to "forget and forgive" but 
he did very little to ameliorate conditions and even negotiated 
some serious violations of the London Convention. 
In 1897 the English Government appointed a commission 
to investigate the mines on the Rand. Their report showed 
serious maladministration on the part of the Boer Government. 
On December 18 of the next year a Johannesburg policeman shot 
an Englishman and was subsequently acquitted of the crime. 
This was a match which lit the tinder. Twenty-one thousand 
British subjects drew up a great petition of their grievances 
and presented it to the Imperial Government with a request for 
protection. 
Negotiations followed these events and the South 
African Republic consented t o certain reforms but it refused 
to consult the Uitlanders generally. At last Smuts offered a 
five year, retrospective franchise provided there would be no 
more interference in internal affairs, that the Queen would 
not assert suzerainty, a.nd that the British concede arbitra-
tion without a foreign element. This proposal was practically 
rejected by the British Government and the offer was withdrawn 
by the Republic. Then the Queen offered to confer on the 
matter of arbitration and to accept the five year franchise if 
it could be shown to be fair to the Uitlanders, otherwise she 
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would make her own proposals. It seems plain that the Boers 
misunderstood the message which was half-hearte·dly meant as a 
practical acceptance of their terms. Consequently they 
issued an ultimatum dated October 9 and requiring an answer 
by five o'clock, October 11. No answer came and the war 
started. On September 27 the Volksraad of the Orange Free 
State had taken action which bound it to cast in its lot with 
that of the Republic • 
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CHAPTER V 
THE BOER WAR 
A. Responsibility for the War • 
It will be well to look a little more closely at the 
causes of the Boer War. We have seen what were the principle 
causes of the Great Trek of 1836. This event had serious re-
sults for the future as it bred in the hearts of the Boers a 
deep dislike of Britain, a love of independence, and an ar-
dent attachment to the Calvinistic faith and to old habits and 
usages. Then came the British meddling with treaty states 
under Adam Kok and Moshesh which served further to agitate' the 
racial feeling between Britons and Boers. Again, in 1877 
another source of friction was made by the annexation of the 
Transvaal to England without the direct consent of the Boer 
inhabitants and in direct opposition to the desires of some of 
them. Even the threat of native problems was not sufficient 
excuse for such action. Moreover, it appears that, in spite 
of the claims of the British that the Boers were incapable of 
dealing with the natives, Sir E. Shepstone was met with a 
supplication from Sekukuni to protect him and his people from 
the Boers. ( l) 
Following these troubles came those over the Pretoria 
and London Conventions. These were envenomed by the fact that 
Gladstone had, in 1877, bitterly denounced the annexation of 
( 1) Gooch, G. P., The War and its Causes. London: 
vaal Committee, 19oo. p. 8. 
The Trans-
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the Transvaal only to treat it as a fait accompli when he be-
came Premier, making no move to grant any sort of independence. 
to the Dutch until the negotiations for the Pretoria Conven-
tion in 1881 • 
However, the events which led to the immediate cause 
of the war began with the discovery of gold on the Witwaters-
rand in 1886. There was a great rush of miners and adventur-
ers to the country and the city of Johannesburg sprang up al-
most overnight, reaching the hundred thousand mark on the eve 
of the war. At first relations between the miners and the 
Boers were amicable. 
But with the advent of Cecil Rhodes and his empire 
building plans a rivalry began between the South African Re-
public under Kruger and the British under Rhodes. This re-
sulted in the famous drifts controversy in which the Boers 
can hardly be blamed for their action, and culminated in the 
Jameson Raid. The animosity between the two peoples continued 
and increased. The immediate issue at the outbreak of the war 
seemed to be one of the enfranchisement of the inhabitants of 
Johannesburg coupled with the suzerainty question. Relative 
to the latter there can be little question. The following 
quotation from Gooch makes the case quite plain. Speaking of 
the London Convention he says: 
"If we turn to the Blue-book, we find that Lord 
Derby, in preparing the treaty, took a copy of the Convention 
of 1881, and wrote in his own hand at the top, 'Passages with 
a black line are to be omitted'. Looking down the page (the 
facsimile is given in the Blue-book, C.950), we find a line 
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drawn around the whole preamble and around the only other two 
references to suzerainty. . . . . . On the day on which Lord 
Derby signed the new Convention, he telegraphed to South Africa, 
'I have today granted to the South African Republic the same 
complete internal independence as is possessed by the Orange 
Free State'. . . . . . In explaining the Treaty in the House of 
Lords, Lord Derby used the following words:- 'We have abstained 
from using the word suzerainty because it was not capable of 
legal definition, and because it seemed a word which was likely 
to lead to misconception and misunderstanding'."(!) 
Upon examining the question of the franchise we find 
that the great cry was that the inhabitants of Johannesburg 
were paying nine-tenths of the Transvaal taxes and still had no 
vote. This was true and yet another angle of approach to the 
question illuminates it in a different light. The taxation of 
the gold machinery was 50 per cent lower than in the Cape Colo-
ny while the royalty on the value of the output was only a 
trifle over .5 per cent, the lowest in the world. At the same 
time in Rhodesia it was 50 per cent and in Canada 10 per cent. 
There was no income tax. By far the greater part of the reve-
nue was derived from the tari ff which was lower than that of 
the Cape Colony.(2) 
The Uitlanders enjoyed the fullest range of free 
speech and were allowed to denounce the Transvaal Government 
about as much as they pleased. SUch a privilege would not 
(1) Op. cit., pp. 11-12. (2) Ibid., p. 18. 
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have been granted them in many countries. While much was said 
about the use of the Dutch language in the public schools yet 
under a law of 1890 there were five schools in the mining dis-
trict where English was the medium of instruction • 
It is improbable that the miners originally thought 
much about obtaining the franchise. At least there is good 
evidence to support this view. In a letter to Mr. Beit dated 
June 16, 1894, Mr. Lionel Phillips writes: "I may say here 
that, as you of course know, I had no desire for political 
rights, and believe, as a whole, that the community is not am-
bitious in this respect".(l) Still, as the community grew and 
promised to continue to exist there were those who settled in 
Johannesburg who intended to stay and who wanted and deserved 
political powers. They had plenty of grievances toward the 
Dutch for their city was very poorly administered and the san-
itation, streets, et cetera were abominable. Yet there is no 
law which can make the citizens of one country either natural-
ize or grant the franchise to citizens of another. And so far 
as internal affairs went the South African Republic had been 
granted complete ·sovereignty. 
On an earlier page we have referred to the negotia-
tions carried on between England and the Boer States.< 2> 
These very negotiations were over the franchise and other 
issues, but principally over the franchise. A seven year 
(1) Gooch, G. P., Op. cit., p. 22. (Also in App. to the Cape 
Colony Report or the Select Committee on the Jameson 
Raid, A.2913, 5/96.) 
(2) See p. 66. 
71 
• 
72 
qualification and then a five had been granted. The last note 
sent by the British to the Boers was afterward claimed by Mr. 
Chamberlain to have been a qualified acceptance of the Dutch 
terms, he having said in the note that the conditions of settle-
ment presented by the Republic were not acceptable in the form 
in which they were presented. He later claimed that it was 
only a matter of form, not one of principle. However, the 
Boers did not understand it in this way and no effort was made 
to explain to them the true meaning of the communication. So 
while the responsibility for declaring war does rest upon the 
Transvaal Government yet the moral responsibility for it rests 
with England who allowed war to be declared when the two 
countries were virtually at agreement. 
Moreover, Mr. Bryce asks two pertinent questions. 
First, were the grievances of England's subjects so serious as 
to form a casus belli? Second, if so was it wise to fight 
considering the probable breaking down of the Transvaal Gov-
ernment? Mr. Kruger, the main cause of the friction on the 
Boer side, was a man seventy-five years old. He would very 
soon have been replaced by other men and those who would have 
replaced him were almost certain to have been men with whom 
England could have dealt satisfactorily. 
The fact is that these questions were never consid-
ered by the Cabinet and, moreover, troops were dispatched to 
South Africa ·before war was even declared by the Transvaal. 
"The only casus belli has been the conduct of the two contend-
ing parties during a negotiation, the professed subject of 
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which was in no sense .a casus belli.n(l) 
Under the conditions what else could the Boers have 
done save declare war unless they had chosen to lay aside every 
consideration of honor and self-respect and surrender to every 
British demand regardless of their injustice? And their only 
hope was in beginning the fight before the new British troops 
reached Africa. Even at that they had practically no chance to 
win for they were a little state of only about 80,000 citizens 
pi tted against the great Empire millions strong. 
These facts do not excuse the wrongs which the Trans-
vaalers had committed in administering their alien residents, 
in overstepping the limits of their treaties with Great Britain 
and trying to push out beyond their borders into Rhodesia and 
surrounding territory when they had agreed not to do so, and in 
showing a most cantankerous spirit while negotiating with the 
Empire. They only serve to show that the Boers were not al-
together responsible for the conflict, that they had some 
strong arguments on their side, that Great Britain shared a 
very large part of the moral responsibility for the war. 
B. The War and the Peace. 
On October 9, 1899, President Kruger's Government 
delivered an ultimatum to the British Agent at Pretoria de-
manding the withdrawal by October 11 of the British troops 
from the Transvaal frontiers and the assurance that the troops 
(1) Bryce, J., Briton and Boer. New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1900. p. 45. 
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then en route to South Africa would not be landed. The demands 
were not complied with and the two countries entered upon a 
long and dreary struggle the difficulties of which neither 
appreciated • 
The Boers were exhilarated by the memory of their il-
lusory victory at Majuba Hill in 1881 thinking that they could 
as easily drive the British out of their country as they had 
then. Moreover, they held high hopes of foreign intervention, 
an event which never took place although the belief that it 
might inspired them to hold on and prolong the war by months 
if not by a year or two. 
On the other side the British were confident of their 
superiority because of their vastly superior numbers if for no 
other reason. They looked for a short, easy war. They did not 
count upon the extreme mobility of the mounted Boer troops 
fighting in a country where they knew every nook and cranny, 
nor on the dogged persistence of their foe, nor on the great 
difficulties of transport which they soon met. 
For our purposes it is useless to go into any detail-
ed account of the war. 
Lord Roberts was immediately placed in command of the 
British army with Lord Kitchener second in command. These two 
men worked admirably together and were loyally supported by 
their Government. On the other hand the Dutch forces had 
little if any central organization. There was Qontinual dis-
agreement and strife between them so that Kitchener could write 
to Lord Salisbury during the early stages of the war, "I am 
glad to say ••.•• the Free Staters seem to have very little 
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heart in the war, and there is certainly a good deal of feeling 
between the Transvaalers and them. The former are much finer 
men in every way, and I expect will make a long and stubborn 
resistence before they give inn.(l) He was correct in his 
prophecy. 
At times the Boers were tantalizingly near success as 
on June 12, 1899 when DeWet barely missed taking Kitchener cap-
tive at a time when Roberts was isolated in the Transvaal. Had 
he succeeded it is probable that the demoralizing effect upon 
the British troops would have been so great as to bring about 
some sort of settlement of the war. 
In December, 1900, Lord Kitchener was given ~11 com-
mand of the British troops although relations between him and 
Lord Roberts continued to be most friendly and co-operative. 
It appeared that the war was practically over at this time and 
that all that remained to be done was to round up a few bands 
of outlaws and police the country. But just at this moment the 
war took on an altogether different character. Instead of pro-
ceeding along the lines of recognized warfare it was changed by 
the Boers into a sort of guerrilla campaign adapted to their 
needs. Consequently the new British commander was faced with a 
novel and unique problem, and one that could not be easily or 
quickly solved. The mobility of the Boers was excessive and 
the only way that Kitchener could deal with the situation was 
to cover the country with a network of small block houses and 
( 1) Arthur, Sir G., Life of Lord Kitchener. New York: 
MacMillan Co., 1920. Vol. I, p. 299. 
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thus divide the country into segments and clear these up one at 
a time. This block house system was worked in conjunction with 
a system of concentration camps into which the women and chil-
dren were gathered and cared for. These camps have brought 
down upon the British Government and upon Lord Kitchener in 
particular the most severe criticism because of tales of cruel-
ty and horror connected with them. Nevertheless they were the 
best thing that the British general could have done for in them 
the Boer women received better care than they would have had at 
home where many of those who were saved alive as it was would 
have undoubtedly starved or died of the epidemics of disease 
which swept the country during the war. Even General Botha ex-
pressed his feeling about the matter in the following words: 
"We are only too glad to know that our women and children are 
under British protection".(!) 
On February 28, 1901, Lord Kitchener and Louis Botha 
held a long conference together a t Middleburg and practically 
came to an agreement for the cessation of the war. Botha him-
self would have undoubtedly capitulated for he saw the hop e-
lessness and the damage to his country of further struggle. 
Kitchener was most conciliator y and advised his Government to 
be so. But Lord Milner and the home Government held out for 
the puni shment of the Cape Boers who had rebelled. At the 
same time Steyn, the Free State president, together with sever-
al other Boer leaders scorned the idea of peace. These facts 
eoupled with a message from old President Kruger who was now in 
(1) Arthur, Sir G., Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 14. 
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Holland, and the ever present hope of foreign intervention in 
behalf of the Boers, brought General Botha's negotiations to 
naught. Consequently the unedifying struggle dragged on for 
more than a year longer. 
At last, in May, 1902, the Boer forces and supplies 
were about exhausted and most of their leaders saw the foolish-
ness of continuing resistance. Especially was this the case 
with the Transvaalers. Of the 11,000 burghers in the field 
almost 3,000 had lost their horses while their fighting 
strength had been reduced by nearly 40 per cent in the last 
twelve months. But they had fought well. A little army not 
over 60,000 strong of which never over 25,000 were mobilized 
at any one time had held the field against the great British 
force the net fighting strength of which stood, on June 19, 
1901, at nearly 164,000, of which number, however, nearly 
100,000 were scattered along the lines of rail and were al-
most wholly on the defensive.(!) 
On May 15, 1902, e. meeting of the two Boer Govern-
ments and sixty delegates convened at Vereeniging. There was 
a cessation of hostilities agreed upon by both Boers and 
British while the conference was in process. On the 17th a 
deputation composed of Botha, De la Rey, De Wet, Smuts, and 
Hertzog was given plenary powers to do what. seemed best on 
the spot and sent to negotiate at Pretoria. This resulted in 
the drafting of a formula by a purely civil sub-committee 
consi.sting of Milner, Solomon, Hertzog, e.nd Smuts. This 
(1) Arthur, Sir G., Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 2-3. 
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draft differed only in two points from the Middleburg terms. 
These referred to the treatment of Natal and of the Cape rebels. 
On the 28th the final decision of the British Government was 
communicated to the Boer delegates, an answer being demanded 
by the evening of the 31st. 
At first it appeared that General De Wet was going to 
remove all chances of peace by his stubborn opposition. How-
ever, he was suddenly converted at the eleventh hour and his 
change in attitude swung the delegation decidedly in favor of 
settlement. The motion for the acceptance of the British terms 
was carried at half past five o'clock on the evening of May 31 
by a vote of 54 to 6. 
The terms of the peace were quite conciliatory, being 
briefly as follows: 
1. The Boers in the field were to lay down their 
arms and hand over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war, and 
desist from further resistance against His Majesty, King Edward. 
2. All burghers outside the two Boer states and all 
prisoners of war were to be repatriated on declaring their al-
legiance to the King of England. 
3. No burghers who surrendered were to be deprived 
of their liberty or property. 
4. No proceedings were to be taken against burghers 
for any legitimate acts of war during the period of hostilities. 
5. If requested by the parents Dutch was to be 
taught in the public schools of the old Boer states, and its 
use was to be permitted in the courts of law where necessary. 
6. Persons requiring rifles for protection could 
secure licehses to keep them. 
7. Civil government was to replace military admin-
istration as soon as possible, and representative institutions, 
leading up to self-government, were to be introduced. 
8. The qu~stion of granting the franchise to 
natives was not to be decided upon until after the inauguration 
of self-government. 
9. No special war tax was to be levied upon landed 
property. 
10. A Commission was to be appointed in each dis-
trict of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony (the new 
name for the Orange Free State) to assist in the restoration of 
the people to their homes and farms and to help re-establish 
them thereon. A grant of 3,000,000! was to be given by the 
British Government as a "free gift" to help the war victims. 
Advances on a loan for the same purpose were to be made, free 
of interest for two years and afterwards, repayable over a 
period of several years with interest at 3 per cent. No 
foreigner or rebel was entitled to this benefit. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE UNION, 1902-1926 
A. Reconstruction and the Formation of the Union. 
The signing of the Peace of Veereniging introduced 
a new and altogether different period in the history of South 
Africa. The Boer states had finally and definitely lost their 
independence. Yet it was not the British intention to grind 
them down unnecessarily. In fact, almost every movement on 
the part of the Government was in the opposite direction. As 
early as 1900 Cecil Rhodes had spoken publicly in the Cape 
Colony pleading for reconciliation between Boer and Briton 
and a burying of all racial prejudice and strife as soon as 
the war should actually end or even before that date. Like-
wise, at the signing of the Peace Schalk Burger, one of the 
prominent Boer leaders, inspired the Dutch to forget the past 
and move into the work which lay before them. "We are stand-
ing", he said, "here at the grave of the two Republics. Much 
yet remains to be done, although we shall not be able to do 
it in the official capacities which we have formerly oc-
cupied. Let us not draw our hands back from the work which 
it is our duty to accomplish. Let us ask God to guide us and 
show us how we shall be enabled to keep our nation together. 
We must be ready to forget and forgive whenever we meet our 
brethren. That part of our nation which has proved unfaith-
ful we must not reject.n(l) 
(1) Arthur, Sir G., Op. cit., p. 103. Vol. II. 
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. The problems of reconstruction were immediately 
tackled by the English under Lord Milner and every possible 
effort was made to heal the feeling between the two races. 
Of course there were bound to be serious points of friction 
as well as irreconcilable groups and individuals. Thus the 
Imperialists in the Cape Colony called for the severest pun-
ishment upon their opponents. 
Aside from the immediate problems of rehabilitation 
of the devastated war areas there were, confronting the Gov-
ernment, matters of much deeper significance and more diffi-
cult solution. There was the racial feeling between Dutch 
and English of which we have spoken before. This had to be 
removed as much as possible in order to have any sort of moral 
peace. There was the matter of working out a system of gov-
ernment which would efficiently administer the new sections 
in conjunction with the old and then the further problem of 
gradually granting self-government to the old Republics. 
There was the problem of working out satisfactory methods 
for handling the interstate commerce and other interests as 
tariff, and native problems. There was the problem of im-
porting labor for the mines. There was the Indian problem 
and the problem of the color bar in general. All these 
political. social. and economic factors coupled with diffi-
culties which we have not mentioned were sufficient to tax 
the surest of judgment. We shall not stop to discuss them at 
this point neither shall we at any point discuss each one of 
them individually for in the last score of years they have 
changed character and it is our ultimate task to discuss the 
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worst of them as they exist today. When we reach this discus-
sion we will again pick up the most important threads of their 
history. Just now let us take a panoramic view of what has 
happened in South Africa since the Boer War. 
In June, 1902, Lord Milner was made Governor of the 
Transvaal, an Executive Council was created, and the two Boer 
colonies were administered under the Crown for the time being. 
Milner did excellent work but his personality was, neverthe-
less, extremely disliked by many of the Dutch. This fact re-
tarded the reconciliation which he had hoped for and he 
realized that it would be best if he withdrew. Consequently 
he resigned in April, 1905, being succeeded by Lord Selborne 
as High Commissioner and Governor of the Transvaal and Orange 
River Colony. 
We have already seen that the terms of peace had 
promised to the new colonies an inaugUration of self-govern-
ment as soon as the move could be made with safety. As a 
consequence of this promise the Lyttleton Constitution was 
gr anted just the month previous to Lord Milner's resignation. 
This constitution provided for a Legislative Council of from 
six to nine appointed members together with thirty to thirty-
five elected members. Both sections of the population were 
granted equal r ights. Thus a good initial step had been tak-
en in the direction of full self-government • 
However, before the new arrangement could become 
effective there was a political overturn in England resulting 
in a Liber al victory headed by Sir Campbell-Bannerman. The 
same month, December, 1906, the Lyttleton Constituti on was 
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abrogated by the granting of complete self-government to the 
Transvaal and the definite promise of it to the Orange River 
Colony. The latter received its constitution in June of the 
following year. Elections were held in the Transvaal in Janu-
ary. The Boer party, or Ret Volk, won a majority in the House 
of Assembly of 69 members. General Botha became Prime Minis-
ter and General Smuts Colonial Secretary. While the choice of 
these incumbents filled the hearts of the rigidly English with 
despair yet nothing finer could have happened to the Transvaal. 
Both men were bent upon the task of building up their own 
country and completing the reconciliation between the two 
races. Moreover, they were both of them men of outstanding 
wisdom and ability. In November of the following year elec-
tions were held in the Orange Free State which scored a very 
decisive victory for the Dutch party. Thirteen of the members 
of the House were returned unopposed while sixteen more Boers 
were also elected, making a total of twenty-nine Organie Unie 
in the House of Assembly of thirty-eight members. The new 
Premier was Mr. Abraham Fischer. Generals Hertzog and De Wet 
also found official places in the Government. 
The next great event to alter the political aspect 
of the country was the formation, in 1909, of the Union of 
South Africa. A wiser step could not have been taken by the 
colonies for their geographical oneness, their Imperial unity 
under the British flag, the racial and cultural unity of their 
people, the interpenetration of their economic interests, and 
the similarity of their problems all cried out against the ex-
isting individual autonomy of administration. Much as the 
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Thirteen Colonies found themselves in serious conflict over 
matters of interstate commerce, political rights, et cetera 
during the days preceding the adoption of the Constitution so 
the South African colonies found themselves in a similar set 
of conflicts. A central government could do much to iron out 
these differences and further amalgamate the antagonistic ele-
ments of the population by common and greater endeavor. 
It had long been the dream of certain enthusiasts to 
have a united South Africa. That was one of Cecil Rhodes' am-
bitions, a South Africa united under the British flag. Many 
of the Boers had cherished in their day the ephemeral vision 
of a South Africa under one great Boer Government. The forma-
tion of the Afrikander Bond in the Cape was partially to this 
end. Then upon the defeat of the Dutch Republics in 1902 we 
have already seen that certain of the Boer leaders as well as 
certain of the English sought to bind South Africa in a unity 
which should be, at least, moral. 
The first formal step toward Union was taken on No-
vember 28, 1906, by Dr. Jameson, Premier of the Cape Colony. 
So many difficulties had arisen between the four colonies 
relative to a number of problems such as native control, rail-
road control, customs, and agriculture that the Cape appealed 
to Lord Selborne to attempt to secure the inauguration of 
"some duly constituted South African authority responsible to 
all parties in the country". The cause was then espoused by 
Jan Hofmeyr, one of the strongest Dutch leaders in the Colony. 
However, results were not immediately forthcoming. In 1908 . 
Dr. Jameson was succeeded by Mr. Merriman. On May 4 of that 
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year an intercolonial conference was called at Pretoria to dis-
cuss the solution of serious customs and railway rate problems 
which had arisen between the four colonies. Under the existing 
situation the difficulties of settlement seemed insurmountable. 
The following year another similar council met and it was dur-
ing this meeting that General Botha moved a series of resolu-
tions the first of which was, "That in the opinion of this Con-
ference, the best interests and permanent prosperity of South 
Africa can only be secured by an early Union, under the Crown 
of Great Britain, of the several self-governing Colonies". As 
a result of these motions a great National Convention composed 
of representatives from Natal, the Transvaal, the Orange Free 
State, and the Cape Colony met at Durban on October 12, 1908, 
afterwards to sit at Cape Town. The situation was full of bog 
holes and yet it was not as hopeless as one might think for 
the Convention had sprung out of common desire. There was a 
most praiseworthy effort to keep it clear of party politics. 
On February 9, 1909, a draft Constitution was published while 
on the 20th of the following September the South Africa Act 
passed the Imperial Parliament and received Royal Assent. On 
May 31, 1910, the Union of South Africa was established. 
The Union was composed of the four colonies which 
had sat in the National Convention. They were now united under 
a provincial system. There had been talk of taking in Rhodesia 
but that project had to be given up. The native states under 
protection of the Crown wanted to see what would become of the 
Union before casting their lot with it. 
Much difficulty had been experienced in selecting the 
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seat of the new Government. Finally a dual capital was decided 
upon, Cape Town became the seat of the Legislature and Pretoria 
the seat of the Executive. At the same time the Judiciary was 
located at Bloemfontein. Thus the more or less childish whims 
of these three states were appeased on that score. 
Other and more serious problems had presented them-
selves, notably that of native control. Some of these were 
settled while others, as the one which we have mentioned, were 
left for the Union to thrash out. 
The Government itself was to consist of a Governor 
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appointed by the King and a two house, elective Parliament with 
a responsible ministry. The Provinces were to be locally ad-
ministered by Provincial Councils which had only limited powers. 
Herbert Gladstone, raised to the Peerage for the occasion, was 
appointed as first Governor while General Botha was elected as 
the first Prime minister of the Union. "Seven years after the 
close of the Boer War, Boer and Briton were united in a common 
effort, with common privileges and responsibilities to work 
out the destinies of European civilization in South Africa. 
The Union is the most remarkable achievement of British states-
manship in the history of the Empire.n{l) 
13. From the Union to the Present Time. 
A great deal has happened since the formation of the 
Union to which it will be impossible to refer. In Chapter I 
( 1) Gibbons, H. A., The New Map of Africa, New York: 
Century Co., 1918. pp. 443-444. 
The 
• 
something was said of the mining, agricultural, and manufactur-
ing growth of the country and we saw that, especially in the 
case of the latter two industries most of this growth has been 
since the Union. Since that time there has also been a great 
labor movement in the country and the problem of the color bar 
has been brought to a head. Syndicalist agitation and Red 
propaganda in general have helped to precipitate two serious 
Rand strikes, one in 1913 and another in 1922. The year 1914 
witnessed a revolt of the nutch in the Union against being 
drafted into service to fight the Germans in Southwest Africa. 
But in every case these disturbances were quelled by the Gov-
ernment. 
On September 15, 1910, General Botha and his Nation-
alist Party were elected to office, carrying 67 out of the 121 
seats. This was a Boer party and embraced both Generals Smuts 
and Hertzog. But in 1913 Hertzog withdrew from Bot~s Cabinet 
and organized a new par ty which he called the Nationalist. 
Thereupon Botha' s party changeo_ its name to South Africa.n 
Party. This remained in power from 1910 to 1924 when it was 
succeeded by the Pact under Hertzog.(!) After General Botha's 
death in 1919 General Smuts assumed full control of the South 
African PartY,. 
Since the World War two matters of special import-
ance have come to the front which will not be discussed else-
where. One of these is the matter of the annexation of cer-
tain of the South African Colonies to the Union. SUch are 
(1) See pp. 93-94. 
87 
• 
Southern Rhodesia., Basutoland, a.nd Swaziland in particular. 
The last two are really native reserves and the natives prefer 
to continue under the Crown until the Union works out a favor-
able native policy. In Southern Rhodesia a referendum was 
held in 1922 on the choice between annexation to the Union and 
responsible self-government. The vote was 8,774 for respon-
sible government to 5,989 for annexation. 
The other matter to which reference was made is the 
mandate of German Southwest Africa. This territory was given 
over to the Union by the League of Nations as a mandate under 
the C class. Southwest Africa is territorially three-fourths 
the size of the Union, covering an area of 322,000 square 
miles. However, its population is small, only about 20,000 
whites of which half' are Germans, and 208,000 natives. In 
1925 the Union Parliament granted the territory a constitution. 
This provided for a partially elective Legislative Assembly 
which was to have restricted powers, being allowed to discuss 
but not to legislate upon several matters permanently reserved 
to the Union Parliament. These were native affairs, railroads, 
public service, mines, posts and telegraphs, justice, immigra.-
tion, defence, currency, and customs. There were also other 
reservations of a temporary character. 
Relations between the Mandate, the Union, and Ger-
many are amicable. In the spring of 1926 the Southwest Party 
was formed in the territory. Its avowed purpose is to bring 
Southwest Africa fully into the Union. This is playing an 
active part in the campaign preceding the first election for 
the Legislature. 
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With these words we shall turn our attention to some 
of the problems now facing the Union • 
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CHAPTER VII 
PRESENT PROBLEMS 
There are several serious problems now facing the 
Union of South Africa. lt is our purpose in this chapter to 
briefly discuss what seem to us to be the five most outstand-
ing of these. Space permits us to do no more than summariz e 
their history and make a few suggestions as to their outcome 
or their solution; yet any one of them is worthy of the most 
detailed and extended deliberation. 
A. Imperial Relations. 
At present the Union of South Africa is one of the 
independent Dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
Yet it is uncertain how long this relationship will be sus-
tained. A part of the Boers have never been quite reconciled 
to the British connection and while the distinctly racial 
feeling in the matter is dying out yet it is leaving in its 
wake a secessionist element with its center in the National-
ists of the Transvaal. The Nationalist Party is a secession-
ist party. But in 1923 when the Pact was formed between the 
Nationalists and the Laborites the former group agreed to 
drop its cry of secession for the duration of the Pact and 
devote its energies to co-operation with Labor to defeat 
General Smuts and the South African Party. 
General Hertzog has, in the main, been true to his 
promise. He is not now an active secessionist, believing 
that the people of the Union are not ready for such a move. 
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Yet his statements during the closing days of Parliament this 
year make his attitude toward the Empire uncertain of analysis. 
On the radical side of his Party faith with the Pact 
has not been kept. The Transvaal Nationalists are led by 
Mr. Tielman Roos, a ybung and r abid secessionist. Roos is con-
stantly embarrassing the Government by his speeches and at the 
same time the Government is powerless to combat him. Acc ord-
ing to the Round Table personal leadership is still by far the 
most potent political force i n South Africa. People stand or 
fall on their own personality and reputation, not on their 
family name. And Mr. Tielman Roos is the demigod of the Tran s-
vaal Boer Nationalists. His position as their leader is un-
assailable and his following is so strong as to make it abso-
lutely necessary to Nationalist supremacy. 
Perhaps the longest step toward secession which has 
b~en taken to the present time was the introduction into the 
Legislative Assembly on May 21, 1926, of a bill for the crea-
tion of a South African National flag. The proposed flag 
would have entirely done away with the Union Jack. It pre-
cipitated some hot debates and blew up a political storm which 
may leave South Africa looking quite different. 
"In regard to the Flag, General Smuts pertinently 
said there had not been any agitation among the Dutch against 
living under the Union Jack, while if the Government's inten-
tion to raise the flag issue and exclude the Union Jack had 
been announced at the 1924 General Election, the Pact could 
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not have got a majority. This is entirely true.n(l) 
The bill did not pass during the session and debate 
on the question still waxes hot. Labor has suggested the use 
of two flags placed side by side, one of which would be the 
Union Jack signifying the Imperial connection, the other to be 
a South African flag signifying her virtually independent 
status. But this hardly seems practicable considering the 
present mental condition of the country. It is too probable 
that some would become ardently devoted to the one emblem and 
others to the other and that further discord would ensue. It 
is unknown how the problem will be solved but in the writer's 
opinion its best solution would be by making it an issue at a 
General Election. The importance of the controversy lies in 
the consequences of anti-Imperial sentiment which might easi-
ly gather around a new emblem. 
In other definite ways the Union is gradually as-
serting her independence and autonomy. In 1925 she reduced 
the tariff rebate to Great Britain and the Dominions by near-
ly two-thirds, a sum of about 600,000!. However, she pro-
fesses to keep Great Britain in the most-~avored-nation 
category. 
Another sign of self-assertion is seen in the pres-
ent agitation for the creation in the Cabinet of a Minister of 
External Affairs. New Zealand has recently taken such a step 
and, among others, the Rand Daily Mail urges it upon South 
Africa. But while this might create a change in Dominion 
(1) London Times. May 31, 1926. p. 13, col. 3. 
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status it does not by any means signify severance from the 
Empire. In fact the Daily Mail also urges General Hertzog to 
attend the Imperial Conference this fall. 
All in all this paper takes a very sane attitude 
toward the Imperial connection. It says, rrEither it is our 
duty to seek to further develop the good relations which at 
present exist between our country and her sister nations of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations, or else we should drop 
the hypocritical habit of 'squealing' on an Imperial note 
whenever it happens to suit us and abusing the Imperial con-
nection when it does notn.(l) This view is supported by the 
Cape Times. 
What the future may bring forth in the matter of 
Imperial relations we dare not prophesy. 
B. The Party Situation. 
The South African PartyC 2) was in power from the 
time of the formation of the Union down to December, 1924, 
when General Smuts appealed to the public in a General Elec-
tion and was defeated by the Pact. In the meantime General 
Hertzog had resigned from the Botha Cabinet and had become 
leader of the Nationalists. At the 1921 election Smuts se-
cured the amalgamation of the Unionist Party, representing 
the big financial interests, and the South African Party • 
He won the election with a solid majority but this proceeded 
(1) London Times, Dec. 18, 1925. p. 16, col. 4. 
(2) Seep. 87. 
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to dwindle due to the loss of several by-elections which were 
necessitated by the death of an extraordinary number of legis-
lators. As a result Smuts' majority in the House of Assembly 
fell from twenty-two to four. Legislation was slow and the 
country was hard hit by the depression which followed the 
World War. These were conditions which the Government could 
not swiftly rectify and for which it was not, in the main, re-
sponsible. Yet, true to human nature, the people blamed it 
for their hard luck. This situation encouraged the National-
ists and Laborites to draw closer together. Hertzog agreed to 
drop the secession issue while Colonel Creswell, the Labor 
head, guaranteed that Labor would be less Red than it had been 
formerly. As a consequence the Pact between the two parties 
was formed. But this was in no sense an organic union of the 
two organizations. Neither one of them gave over any of their 
fundamental planks, they merely agreed to forget their differ-
ences for the time being and combine against a common foe. 
The scheme worked. As the result of the loss of a by-election 
in the Transvaal General Smuts announced his decision on April 
7, 1924, to advise the Governor General to dissolve Parliament 
and hold a General Election. In 1921 the issues had been 
secession and republicanism; in 1924 there were no real issues. 
The upheaval was rather the result of discontent with the 
times and with General Smuts' rather too autocratic and in-
cisive character. The Nationalists hated him for his supres-
sion of the 1914 rebellion while the Laborites held their 
grudge mainly because of his tre~tment of the Johannesburg 
strike in 1922. 
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The Election resulted in a Pact victory and General 
Hertzog became Premier. 
But time has not treated either the Pact or its com-
ponent parties too kindly. To be sure, it still continues as 
the Official Government, but plainly it is drawing to the point 
of disruption. The air is full of uncertainty as to what will 
happen. The Labor Party oscillates between communism and a 
mild form of socialism. At their Party Congress at Port Eliza-
beth last January the Reds were decidedly in control. Colonel 
Creswell received insult after insult while Mr. Madeley, re-
cently appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, stated, re-
ferring to Red sentiment: "I stand for it -- let there be no 
bones about it. --- I t is my determination --- to press for-
ward for what is known in this country as extremism, which, in 
my opinion, is the only thing that matters".(l) Yet, when 
Parliament opened a few weeks later Colonel Creswell was again 
elevated to his place of supremacy and several Party votes of 
sympathy and confidence were cast in his favor. Still, the 
spectre of Communism haunts the scene and makes life uneasy 
for the other members of the Party and of the Pact. 
On the Nationalist side there is the rupture caused 
by Mr. Tielman Roos and his disciples. He continually and 
irresponsibly harps upon the subject of secession and also 
vigorously combats General Hertzog's Native Policy. The latter 
is perhaps the most vital work which the Government has to do 
and above all it should have harmony within its own ranks on 
(1) London Times. Jan. 4, 1926. p. 12, col. 3. 
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the subject. Roes' leaning seems to be toward Labor and Social-
ism. His position just about cripples the Nationalist Party. 
Another matter of importance also figures into our 
consideration. The forces which precipitated the Pact are about 
gone. The 1925-26 budget transformed a deficit of 112,0001 into 
a surplus of 800,0001, the first real surplus which the Govern-
ment has known since 1920. It gave evidence that the worst of 
the hard times have lifted. Moreover, the country is becoming 
a little impatient with General Hertzog's slowness while some 
yearn for Smuts to get back into power. And again, both the 
Nationalist and the Labor Parties are remembering that they have 
platforms which are not very reconcilable to each other. In the 
opinion of some it is time that each party was about its own 
business. 
On the other hand the main and practically only differ-
ence between the Nationalist and the South African Parties is 
their stand on secession. Unfortunately there is a great deal 
of personal animosity between their leaders but even that was 
softening rapidly up to three or four months ago. As to whether 
the events of the last Parliamentary Session again irreconcilab-
ly separated them it is hard to tell. But it is the truth that 
during the recess last fall and winter there was considerable 
talk of rapprochement between the two parties. At the time Mr. 
Roos was the main obstacle in the way of union for he would not 
drop his pet secessionist plank. It would undoubtedly be a 
blessing to South Africa if he would definitely make the break 
from the ranks of the Nationalists and either establish a small 
party of his own or else join the Labor forces. This would 
• 
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leave the Nationalists and the South Africans free to join hands 
and proceed with the Government in a less unstable and turbulent 
fashion. 
The latest political crisis was caused by the Flag 
Bill to which we have referred. It is doubtful whether the 
Labor Party would stand for the total abolition of the Union 
Jack. The South African Party is, if not fighting with them on 
that score, fighting in the same direction. The Nationalist 
stand is undoubtedly Roos' work although we cannot be certain 
about this. Thus we see that the political barometer is steadi-
ly going down. One thing seems certain, that is that a storm 
is not far off and that when it comes it will probably break up 
the Pact. What will happen then one cannot tell. 
C. The Provincial Problem. 
The Union of South Africa was a unique experiment in 
the provincial system of government and one which, it is the 
consensus of opinion, will not be tried again. The form of 
government turned out somewhat different than was expected or 
desired. A federation was wanted but a union was obtained. 
General Smuts admits, "The system as embodied in the South 
Africa Act was largely the work of Mr. Merriman and myself, but 
we looked upon it as an experiment to be resorted to in order 
to satisfy the feelings of the two smaller provinces. Our idea 
was different from what has eventuated. Our idea was that the 
Provincial Councils should be entrusted with a number of im-
portant functions, essentially of a non-party character. The 
basic idea we had was that party politics would not become a 
• 
prominent idea of the provincial system".(l) 
But that which the drafters of the idea did not want 
to happen has been exactly what has happened. Today the Pro-
vincial Councils are rotten with politics. They have most 
limited powers of taxation and of legislation yet they carry on 
with all the paraphernalia of a full-grown legislative body. 
Most of the Parliamentary electoral districts coincide with the 
electoral districts of the Provincial Councils so that the same 
party machinery which handles the Parliamentary elections 
handles the Provincial elections. This gives the Provincial 
System all the evils of the Party System with none of its ad-
vantages, for the finances of the Provinces are furnished main-
ly by the Union Government and so the voters have little check 
upon the Councils which spend the revenue but do not have to 
raise much of it. At the same time this system embodies all 
the evils of local government without giving very many of its 
advantages. It cannot be truly local as was intended for the 
Provinces are too large to be administered by just one body 
acting on local government principles. The Cape Province has 
an area of 277,000 square miles, twice that of Great Britain 
and Ireland together, while the Transvaal c.overs an area of 
over 100,000 square miles. 
The problem of provincial finance is the one at the 
root of the whole matter. It is one of the main causes of the 
overthrow of the Smuts' Government. The Provinces are con-
tinually in debt and when new grants are given them they always 
(1) Round Table, No. 61, Dec. 1925. p. 198. 
98 
• 
99 
spend to the limit. Yet over this expenditure the Union Govern-
ment has no control. In the opinion of the Round Table the sys-
tem is now getting its last chance. I n 1925 Parliament voted to 
raise the grants to the Provinces and place the subsidy upon a 
per capita basis of school children. But this basis is sure to 
lead to an automatic yearly increase of the subsidy. When the 
time comes that revenue is less buoyant trouble is liable to 
ensue from the arrangement. 
Relative to all this we quote: 
"On the one hand Parliament votes away to the Prov-
inces one-fifth of the national revenue to ne spent in ways 
which are not really under Parliament's control , while, on the 
other hand, the Provinces raise a smaller proportion than ever 
of the money they spend. - - - If we add to increased subsidy the 
amount accuring from 'assigned taxes', i.e., taxes levied by 
the Union Government but assigned to the Provinces --- we get 
an amount which, in the case of certain Provinces at least, 
must cover 80 or 85 per cent of their total expenditure. This 
fact reduces to very little force the Minister's reply to an 
objection against provincial extravagances that the taxpayers 
could turn out the Provincial Council. In so doing they would 
not be turning out the body which really raised the money. 
There can be no doubt ths,t the pre tensions and paraphernalia. 
of Provincial Councils are now more than ever out of proportion 
to their real authority and responsibility.n(l) 
Further, the problem of education is the center of 
(1) Round Table, No. 61. Dec. 1925. pp. 196-97. 
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the financial problem of the Provinces. Seventy-five per cent 
of the provincial expenditures are for this purpose.(l) This 
would .not be so startling if the system was efficient. But it 
necessarily cannot be for there is no real local authority for 
it. Each Province controls its own educational system almost 
entirely through its Provincial Council. The result is a 
prosaic and most inefficient system.( 2) The present schools 
are ill adapted to either the social or the economic need of 
the country. The cost of education is high, in the Transvaal 
the per capita rate being nearly twice what it is in England 
and Wales, while the rate in the Cape Province is over ten per 
cent higher than in the mother country. 
Another need of the educational system is for a 
really central authority to administer it in the whole Uni on. 
The Union Parliament of 1925 either directly or indirectly set 
aside almost one-fourth of its total revenue for educational 
purposes. Yet over this money it has almost no control. In-
dustrial education is the great and crying need of the country 
for it is only by this method that. the standard of life and 
the economic demand of the native can be raised nearer to that 
of the white man; and on the latter achievement rests the 
security of the white race in South Africa. General Smuts' 
view is that "in well-planned. and wisely administered schemes 
of education must lie the chief hope of security_. The danger 
is not that too little ma~ be spent, but that it may be spent 
(1) Round Table, No. 50, Mar. 1923, p. 436. 
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(2) One who is in doubt on this point will do well to read Dr . 
Loram's The Education of the South African Native. 
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to too little effect owing to the want of co-ordination that 
arises from the absence of a central administrative authority 
to control the expenditure of the money voted by a central 
legislative authority. 
Further, industrialization will bring new problems 
that need central 'single-minded authority' in close and vital 
touch with the all-powerful economic facts, if education is to 
be wisely adjusted to its proper ends."(l) 
But if such a system is worked out, and it obviously 
will have to be for the salvation of the white race in South 
Africa, it will mean a departure from the present provincial 
system. Either the Union will become a federation and thus 
shoulder each of the present Provinces with the burden of 
raising its own revenue or else, and this seems the more prob-
able, the Provincial Councils will gradually lose their power 
and importance to the central Union Government which will in 
turn establish some sort of workable local administration for 
both government and schools. 
D. The Indian Problem. 
One of the worst problems facing the Union today is 
that of properly disposing of the 166,000 Indians domiciled 
within her borders. We have already seen that in 1860 inden-
tured Indian coolies were first introduced into South Africa 
for the purpose of working on the Natal sugar plantations.( 2) 
(1) Round Table, No. 61, Dec. 1925. pp. 197-98. 
(2) See p. 56. 
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These coolies were to serve for five years on the plantations 
and then to live for another five as free.men in Natal after 
which they would be given either their return passage home or 
a grant of Crown land to the value of the return passage. 
The system was so successful that their pay, which was hardly 
more than a pittance, was raised in 1864 to 15s per month for 
the final year. 
By 1865 there were 6,000 Indians in Natal and the 
plantation owners were eager for more. Five years later the 
offer of Crown land was repeated and at that time the Coloni-
al Secretary wrote: "There is every reason to believe that 
the Indian immigrants wil l become permanent residents of 
Natal " • ( 1 ) 
The fo l lowing table shows the increase in the vari-
ous portions of the Natal population down to 1891. 
Population( 2) 
Year Eur opean Indian Bantu(3) 
1876 18,846 6,787 281,797 
1884 35,453 27 t 206 361,766 
1891 46,788 35,763 455,983 
During the latter year indentured coolies were still 
pouring in and two - thirds of those in .Natal were already free. 
The latter even penetrated into the ranks of skilled labor. 
It was during this year that the reaction against Indian immi-
gration began. 
(1) Round Table, No. 63, June, 1926 . p. 637. 
( 2) Ibid. 
(3) Exclusive of Zululand. 
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It must be remembered that since the cutting of the Suez 
Canal ships no longer went from Europe to India and back again 
via South Africa. Consequently the South Africans had for-
gotten what the bulk of the Indians were; they rarely saw any 
but their coolies nowadays. Their experience now was almost 
exclusively with the lowest classes of Madrassi. In 1912 
Mr. Gokhale, speaking in Bombay, explained that "four-fifths 
of the entire Indian population of South Africa represented 
indentured, or ex-indentured laborers, and their descendents. 
The remainder were free persons who had gone there at their 
own expense in the wake of the indentured laborers. One 
peculiarity of the position --- was that there was no educat-
ed class among the Indians in South Africa similar to the 
educated class of this country (India) .n(l) 
The coolies invariably lived in a slovenly, filthy 
manner and this low standard of living among so large a number 
of laborers constituted a threat to white labor. This fear 
on the part of the whites was undoubtedly raised to a higher 
power by the color exponent. 
In 1891 the offer of Crown land was withdrawn. Two 
years later, as soon as self-government had been granted, 
Natal tried to arrange with the Indian authorities to rid her-
self of her Asiatics. The attempt failed. 
The free Indians had, in the meantime, obtained the 
franchise on the same ground as· coloured persons but now the 
Parliamentary franchise was denied to all immigrants who came 
(1) Round Table, No. 15, June, 1913. p. 464. 
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from countries not having representative institutions. Of 
course this was aimed at the Indians. By 1920 there were only 
45 Indians in Natal who still held the franchise. 
Other restrictions were placed upon the coolies, 
economic restrictions were enforced, and an educational test 
was applied at the ports of entry. 
However, all the Indians did not remain in Natal 
after their indenture was worked out. Some of them went to 
the interior. The Orange Free State refused them admission. 
A few got into the Cape Colony where they secured full rights 
of citizenship which they still possess. But in 1.902 the Cape 
put a stop to any further extensive immigration by ap~lying an 
educational test. Southern Rhodesia did likewise in 1903. 
But the Transvaal proved to be more nearly their Mecca. Of 
course, they were met with hostility from the Boer Gov ernment 
and later. from the English Government but even at that they 
had better opportunities there than in the other colonies. 
Moreover, the Transvaal immigrants were largely traders, the 
Surat or "Arabs" of North India. But India was getting sick 
of the treatment which her people were receiving at the hands 
of the South Africans and consequently when the Transvaal 
called for the importation of more coolies to help with the 
reconstruction after the Boer War the Indian Government re-
fuse~. Then followed the Chinese episode • 
When at last the Transvaal again gained self-govern-
ment in 1907 it immediately passed an Act enforcing an educa-
tion test and a finger print registration law applicable to 
all Indians. By the Gold and Township Act of 1908 it forbade 
104 
non-Europeans to occupy lands in proclaimed gold areas. This 
excluded them from most of the township l ands along the Rand 
and elsewhere. About this time the Indians started their 
passive resistance. Meanwhile the Natalians were again im-
porting more coolies, this time for work on tea plantations. 
"On the other hand, from 1907 onwards, the Indian 
Government, under Lord Minto, began to set its face against 
the whole system of indentured labour. That system was bring-
ing little but misery to the Indi~n villages which native 
touts, paid by the colonial Governments concerned, .harried 
for recruits. No less certain i t brought moral degradation 
to most of the coolies and to the unhappy women immigrants 
one to every three men which the law demanded.n(l) In 
1908 Natal was informed that no more Indians would be forth-
coming. This step was immediately caused by the new Dealers' 
Licenses Act in Natal which bore so hard upon the Indian 
traders. Recruiting was permitted until July, 1911. In 1916 
the last Natal cooly finished his indentures. 
By 1910 there were 7,000 Asiatics in the Cape 
Province, 11,000 in the Transvaal, and 133,000 in Natal and 
Zululand. Most of these were Indians. The alarming feature 
in Natal was that the Asiatics outnumbered the Europeans who 
also had to face nearly a million Bantu. And then to compli -
cate matters Mr. Gandhi, animating spirit of passive resist-
ance, linked up his South African agitation with the political 
movement in India. 
(1) Round Table, No. 63, June, 1926. p. 641. 
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In 1913, after much negotiation and compromise with 
the Indian Government, the Union passed an Immigration Bill 
which gave the Executive wide powers to exclude any immigrant 
on the grounds of economic or social unfitness subject to an 
appeal to the courts. This was especially hard on domiciled 
Indians whose wives were still in India. Mr. Gandhi fought it 
as well as the many other serious disabilities under which 
the South African Indians suffered. As a consequence the next 
year a Relief Act was passed and at the same time the Smuts-
Gandhi agreement was made. This agreement was embodied in two 
letters and was supposed to mean that whatever future legis-
lation might be necessary the position of the domiciled Ind-
ians would not be made worse. In no sense can the agreement 
be considered as binding save as a moral obligation assumed 
by General Smuts. It was not official. Yet it was taken by 
Gandhi as a base from which to operate in clearing up matters 
of land holding, trading, free internal movement, and fran-
chise. At this time the World War broke in upon the scene 
and practically all attention was turned to that. 
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India emerged from the War with a much keener nation-
al pride and demanded the removal of disabilities from her 
people in all parts of the Empire. But in 1918 both South 
Africa and India reaffirmed the principle that each country 
should be free to control its own immigration. Again, at the 
Imperial Conferences of 1921 and 1923 General Smuts refused 
on economic grounds to ask South Africa to grant d.omiciled 
Indians full rights of citizenship. The other Dominions 
• 
granted India's request in this respect but it must be rememb-
ered that they had no real Indian problem for Canada, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand together domicile only 4,800 Indians 
whereas the Union embraces 166,000. 
Meanwhile the Asiatics in the Transvaal had found 
ways _of evading the land laws. They could not personally own 
land but they could form limited liability companies and own 
it through them. Three of these companies existed in 1913; 
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in 1919 370 were in operation. Others got around the law by 
mortgaging land from Europeans. At the same time the Indian 
traders pushed out till the Krugersdorp shopkeepers complained 
and, in 1919, obtained an injunction against a European who 
was leasing proclaimed land to an Indian tailor. Other in-
junctions followed. Then came Parliamentary Act No. 37 of 
1919 which was based upon the recommendation of a select com-
mittee. According to this trading licenses held by Indians 
in proclaimed gold areas were to be renewed, but no others 
were to be issued. Moreover, the limited liabilities and 
mortgage loopholes were closed up although vested rights 
acquired prior to May, 1919, were to be respected. In view 
of racial antipathy reason for this law can be seen since 
over 5,800 of the 16,000 traders in the Transvaal were 
Indians. ( 1) 
While there had been practically no immigration 
since 1913 and while many of the Indians were unmarried yet 
anti-Asiatic agitation continued, centering in Krugersdorp. 
(1) Round Table, No. 60, Sept., 1925. p. 836. 
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Times were hard due to the post-war slump and the European 
mind in south Africa was all upset over the native problem and 
the outlook of the f uture for the white race. Semi- and un-
skilled laborers were unemployed and this hit the "poor whites" 
especially hard. Moreover, the Indians seemed to possess a 
peculiar stigma since they were the representatives•of an old 
civilization and were thought to be unassimilable under any 
conditions. It was forgotten that now 68 per cent of them 
were native born South Africans. 
In 1922 and 1923 new Natal ordinances f orbade 
Indians to purchase or lease lands belonging to municipalities. 
This hampered them in Durban especially since most of the land 
in that city is municipally owned. In 1924-25 Natal Indians 
were further deprived of the municipal franchise. Then, in 
accordance with election pledges, the Hertzog Ministry intro-
duced into Legislative Assembly in 1924 the Areas Reservation 
and Immigration and Registration (Further Provision) Bill, 
otherwise known as the Asiatic Bill. This was "avowedly in-
tended, while eschewing for ce , 'to supplement ••.•• the in-
duc ement which is held out to Indians to l eave the country. "'(1) 
The above Bill was shelved in 1925 but was brought 
forward again in the 1926 session. It conta.ins the following 
provisions; 
1. Power for the urban local authorities, subject 
to the approval after inquiry of the Union Government, to set 
apart separate residential and commercial districts for the 
(1) Round Table, No. 63, June, 1926. pp. 649-50. 
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Indians. 
2. That no Indian can acquire land outside of an 
area in Natal extending 30 miles inland from the coast and 
here only from a person of the same class. 
3. That the exercise of the right granted to 
Indians as a result of the Smuts-Gandhi agreement to intro-
duce wives f rom India be limited to five years. 
India sought a round table conference on the ques-
tion but her plan fell through. Other efforts at negotiation 
failed until the Union Government offered to give the Govern-
ment of India the fullest liberty of presenting its case be-
fore Parliament by setting up a select committee to consider 
the whole matter before the second reading of the Bill. 
This offer was accepted by India and the committee was in-
structed to report on April 23, 1926. But on tha t date Dr. 
Malan, Minister of the Interior, announced that the Indian 
Government had offered to deliberate with a deputation from 
South Africa upon the best methods of solving the problem. 
This was agreed to and the matter was dropped for this year. 
It was expected that an attempt would be made with the co-
operation of the Indian Government to draft a scheme for 
repatriation. Here the matter rests until the next Parlia-
ment opens. 
I t seems to the author that almost the whole matter 
rests upon the psychological effect of the native problem 
upon the European South Africa. .At present the Indians 
equal about one-tenth of the European population of the Union. 
This surely could be no menace in itself. They constitute 
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only one-fortieth of the entire population. The. Asiatics in 
the Transvaal increased only 21 per cent from 1911-21 while 
the European population increased 29 per cent. In Natal the 
Asiatic increase over the same period was only 5.5 per cent 
as against a 40 per cent increase in the European.. The ex-
cess of Asiatics over Europeans in Natal has been reduced 
from 36 per cent in 1911 to l ess than 3 per cent in 1921.(1) 
Moreover, the investigation by the recent select committee 
also showed that there are fewer Indians in the Transvaal 
today than there were ten years ago. 
The present situation is immediately caused not by 
the numbers of the Indians but rather by retail trade rival-
ry, neglect of sanitation by the Indians, their indulgence 
in uncouth religious festiv:als, and color and race prejudice. 
Of these causes the last one is undoubtedly the most potent. 
The Asiatics would present only a minor political and in-
dustrial problem if it was not for the native. Yet they are 
viewed from a different standpoint than is the latter. 
"The Native problem is . indigenous to the soil. 
The Indian is a stranger and he brings another racial antago-
nism into South Africa. Socially he stands distinct from 
the European, and yet he is dependent on the European in the 
sense that he would not survive permanently in the country 
without the presence of the European. He is thus by many of 
(1) Round Table, No. 46, Mar., 1922. British Indians 
in South Africa. 
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the Europeans regarded as a parasite, in that he depends in a 
sense on the protection of the European, while at the same time 
by his competition he weakens the position of the European vis-
I 
a-vis the native. The grant to him of concessions, political 
or economic, will, they feel, be used to reinforce the demands 
of the natives for similar treatment, and will make their de-
mand still more difficult to meet.n(l) · 
Thus the problem is a thorny one and is complicated 
by the fact that the Indian Government as well as the South 
African Indians must be reckoned with. It is improbable that 
any just plan of repatriation can be formulated since so many 
of the South African Indians are now native to the Union. 
Having been brought there by European desire they should not 
now be kicked out against their own will. But on the other 
hand are the Indians to be given full rights of citizenship 
and granted the franchise upon the same conditions that it is 
granted to Europeans? Whatever we may think of the ethics of 
such a move there is no possibility of its happening for, as 
we have seen above, it would be very apt to render the native 
problem infinitely more serious. Then there seems to be but 
one alternative, to hold the Indians down to their present 
level or grind them to a lower and let them squirm. This is 
exactly what the Asiatic Bill attempted and this too is ex-
actly what the passage of the Color Bar Bill on May 12, 1926, 
has done.< 2) 
(1) Round Table, No. 63, pp. 650-51. 
(2) See pp. 117-119. 
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But it seems to the author that there is a far better 
solution than this one which is apparently being pursued. Per-
haps something could be worked out along the line:3 of General 
Hertzog's native policy.(l) Anyway it is certain that the so-
lutions of the two problems are not far apart unless repatria-
tion can be effected. In the policy which we have suggested 
education would play a large part. If the Indian and if the 
native can be educated to the point where their demands in 
life parallel those of the white man t he economic phase of the 
whole color problem will die out. This process of education 
will take generations to perform and it will cost an almost 
infinite amount of money but it is certainly the only just and 
final solution to the problem. In the meantime the Indians 
could be segregated as much as possible in a colony and given 
the powers of local self- government in some such way as the 
natives now enjoy it in the Transkei.( 2) Their Parliamentary 
representation could be put upon the same basis as that 
worked out for the natives. The majority of South African 
born Indians "would not resent a measure of segregation based 
on social, religious, economic , and cultural differences if 
there were no undue insistence on the superiority of European 
traditions and customs". ( 3) 
This scheme might not work so well if the Indians 
were of a higher class and more educated in the ways of their 
( 1) · See p. 123. 
( 2) See p . 123, footnote ( 2) • 
{3) London Times, Nov. 5, 1925. p. 13, col. 4 • 
.a ' 
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own civilization. But admittedly they are, for the most part, 
of an inferior type, with a mentality at least but little more 
than equal to that of the Bantu. So if our scheme was applied 
to Indians and natives at the same time the two races would 
grow together into a new civilization and would some day 
emerge, as the Bantu surely will, to be the predominant social, 
political, and economic factor in South Africa. 
E. The Native Problem.(!) 
The last and the most important matter with which we 
shall deal is the native problem. Why is it the most i m-
por tant? Because on it hinge s the whole f uture of the country. 
From the standpoint of the white man the future outlook in 
South Africa is dismal. "It is not easy for those who have 
not lived in the Union of South Africa to visualize the po-
sition of the natives in those provinces. The prc1blems are 
so complex, the danger is so pressing, the outlook is so un-
certain that one may be pardoned for taking a gloomy view 
both of the future of the white race in the sub-continent 
and the future of the natives themselves. To state the po-
sition frankly and concisely it must be admitted that the 
impact of European civilization upon the natives of South 
Africa in certain respects, though fortunately not in all, 
has been disastrous. because there the native can only be 
assimilated into the social system as a helot rather than as 
(1) See pp. 22-25. See also Dr. Willoughby's excellent 
book, Race Problems in the New Africa. 
a sharer in the full benefits of white civilization. ,t( 1) . Let 
us now briefly consider the problem. 
1. The social aspect . 
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In South Africa the black man i s a socia l outcast 
just as he is in the southern United States. He is acceptable , 
even eagerly sought after , as a laborer or as a domestic serv-
ant , but he is neither wanted nor treated as a companion. He 
is not allowed to live in white ~uarters but is rather shoved 
off into filthy sections on the outskirts of the cities or 
else restricted to areas in which the land is usually the 
worst to be found. This is not universally true but it is the 
majority rule in the Union. From the mouths of the mission-
aries the native hears soft words about fair play and Chris-
tian brotherhood. Then he turns and is faced by the harsh 
realities of racial discrimination which are imposed by the 
Government and the common people. "It may be stated as a 
general axiom that Christianity as preached by the mission-
aries has received a setback wherever native Africans have 
come into direct contact with Europeans.n(2) The white man's 
reason for this discrimination is that he may protect his. own 
"civilization, institutions, and purity of race". 
We must remember that in spite of the ~act that the 
Bantu in the Union are but little removed from savagery yet 
they have a distinctive culture which has its contribution to 
(1) Lewin, E., The Black Cloud in Africa. For. Aff. , Vol. 4, 
No. 4. July, 1926 . p. 643. 
(2) Ibid., p. 639. 
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make to the world just as surely as has European culture. Of 
course these two cannot mix without interfering more or less 
with each other. Moreover, it is the most apparent of facts 
that the civilization of the Bantu is morally, intellectually, 
and socially inferior to that of the European. Another ap-
parent fact is that where two races or cultures mix, and es-
pecially where the mixture is tainted with prejudice, it is 
far easier for a mutual exchange of vices than of virtues to 
take place. Thus in the case of the South African coming in-
to contact with Europeans and European institutions, the Euro-
pean vices easily take root in the morally weak Bantu and 
when we add to this the fact that the Bantu seldom sees any-
thing better than the neutral side of European goodness it 
makes the matter worse. It would undoubtedly be best for the 
Bantu if he could be segregated and taught the principles and 
ways of civilization and allowed to develop his own cultural 
system without coming into direct contact with European in-
sti~~tions as they exist today. 
On the other hand, such a procedure wou.ld also be 
best for the social welfare of the European. Blinded by 
prejudice, the European has little to learn from the native 
save his vices. The native code of morals is very much lower 
than our own. So low is it that many missionaries forbid 
their children to learn the native dialects. European socie-
ty cannot help but be harmed by social contact with such 
peoples. 
So we must arrive at the conclusion that a policy 
of segregation would be the first step in an ideal solution 
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of the social problem. But such segregation, if it could be 
carried out, must not become discrimination, it must be upon 
the basis of equal opportunity for both white and black, that 
opportunity to be judged by the relative capabilities of the 
two races. Thereafter the problem resolves itself into one 
of education and evangelization. 
Yet such a policy has its serious drawbacks for, as 
Oldham states, ''the greater the separateness, the fewer mus t 
be the opportunities of mutual understanding". Moreover, be-
cause of the close intertwining of the economic l i fe of the 
whites and the blacks, a policy of complete segregation can 
never be effected in the Union unless the day comes when the 
white man is shoved out altogether. Consequently our best 
solution is as complete segregation as possible coupled with 
a relentless educational policy. To this must be added a 
constant effort to bring about a better understanding be-
tween the two races. It must be done in the Christian spirit 
for it is only this spirit which can remove the cancer of 
racial prejudice. "The Christian spirit, which is essential-
ly missionary and inclusive, can never reconcile itself to 
any barriers which separate man from man. It must continual-
ly strive to pass beyond them· in order to realize the fellow-
ship which unites those who are the children of a common 
Father . The Christian, ••.•• is dedicated to the service of 
a purpose of righteousness and love which transcends all 
natural differences between men; and every individual is for 
him a potential, if not an actual, comrade in the adventure 
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of establishing the Kingdom of God.n(l) Only in this spirit 
can any aspect of the race problem in South Africa, or in any 
country, be finally solved. 
2. The economic aspect or the color bar. 
The color bar may be thought of as applying to the 
social and political realms as well as to the economic but at 
· present we shall use it in the restricted sense as it finds 
expression in the Mines and Factories Act , otherwise called 
the Color Bar Bill, which recently became law in the Union. 
Perhaps we can best orient ourselves by starting our discus-
sion with the history and provisions of this Bill. 
In the Transvaal mines it has long been the practice 
to refuse to non-Europeans positions which required skilled 
workmen. However, in 1923 the Transvaal Supreme Court decided 
that the mining regulations embodying this principle were 
"ultra vires the Mines and Works Act and were , moreover, 
'prima facie repugnant to the law of the land, unreasonable, 
and even capricious and arbitrary'n.(2) 
However, in his election campaign General Hertzog 
promised to inaugurate a definite native policy, and as a 
first step in this policy he introduced into Parliament the 
Color Bar Bill which passed its first reading in the House on 
February 16, 1925. From the very first the debate over it 
was hot. The Bill provided that in the case of those po -
sitions of labor in mines and factories which require that a 
(1) Oldham, J.H., Christianity and the Race Problem. p . 175. 
(2) London Times, Feb. 17, 1925. p. 13, col . 2. 
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certificate of competency be obtained by the workman such cer-
tificates "shall not be granted t o natives or Asiatics". The 
Government claimed that such a law was wanted merely for the 
protection of the laborers in t he mines where accidents had 
in~reased from 2 . 59 per 1000 employees in 1921 to 3.27 per 
1000 in 1923.(1) But these figures ignore accidents "due to 
rock bursts which have l atterly become common due to pressure 
on walls and pillars of rock in lowest levels 11 . ( 2) Moreover, 
the Government refused an amendment to the Act which would 
have made it applicable to the mines only . ·As it stands it 
applies to all positions of skilled labor in the whole Union , 
with the specific exemption of domestic servants and agri-
cultural workers . 
During the 1925 session of Parliament the Bill was 
passed by the House but rejected by the Senate where the 
Opposition enjoys a majority. After a Bill has once been re-
jected by the Senate it cannot be brought forward again till 
the next Parliamentary session. Then it must start in fresh , 
pass the House , and if it is rejected by the Senate this 
second time it can be voted upon by a session of both Houses 
s i t ting together at which time a majority vote will make it 
law. This is exactly what happened during the 1926 session. 
The Color Ear Bill was reintroduced into the House o~ As-
sembly and was passed by that body, it was then r~l j ected by 
the Senate , a.nd finally, at a joint session of both Houses, 
(1) Round Table, No. 60 , Sept., 1925. p. 835. 
( 2) Ibid . 
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it was passed on May 12 by a vote of 83 to 67. 
This is the first chapter in General Hertzog's nat~ve 
policy and according to General Smuts it spoils the whole book. 
Not only does it take from the native s and the siatics the 
possibility of becoming skilled laborers but it also bluntly 
classes the Asiatics in the same group with the natives. This 
will be sure to further envenom the Indian problem for it is a 
serious blow to Indian pride to be classified thus in public, 
although in practice they realize that they cannot be put much 
higher. Nevertheless, it was a needless and c~uel thrust at 
an already much abused people. The desired operation of the 
law could have been effected without specifying the Asiatics 
by name. 
Again, the law takes from the native not only the 
possibility of becoming skilled in labor but it does nothing 
to guarantee him any compensation in the form of lP~d. Thus 
it in itself bans him forever to the dark realms of unskilled 
labor. As Mr. J1ewin says, if the native attains an education 
he has little chance to use it. 
This condition is bad not only for the native but 
also for the white laborer. Mr. W.E.B.DuBois in discussing 
the color bar in general states that there are two extreme . 
attitudes held by labor today. One of these centers in Russia 
and draws no color line whatsoever; the other centers in South 
Africa and would , and now does, exclude colored persons from 
skilled labor. He says: 
"Between these extremes waver the white workers of 
the rest of the world. On the whole they still lean rather 
toward the attitude of South Africa than that of Russia. They 
exclude color from empty Australia. They sit in armed truce 
in America where the Negroes are f orcing their way into the 
ranks of union labor by breaking strikes and underbidding them 
in wage. 
"It is precisely by these tactics however, and by 
hindering the natural flow of labor toward the highest wage 
and best conditions in the world that white labor is segregat-
ing colored labor in just those parts of the world. where it 
can be most easily exploited by white capital and thu s giving 
white capital the power to rule all labor, white and black, 
in the rest of the world. "(l) 
This is all very true. The security of the white 
person in South Africa res ts in the agricultural and in-
dustrial education and development of the native. But the 
problem is broader in its scope than South Africa, as Mr. 
DuBois shows it is ultimately a matter of world importance. 
- It is true that South Africa is facing a critical 
unemployment situation. The recently enacted color bar may 
remedy this to some extent as it will provide more skilled 
labor for white persons. It was an alarming fact that the 
Director of Census recently pointea_ out that "only 50 per 
cent of our boys and girls annua.lly leaving school can now 
be placed in employment".( 2) If they did find employment it 
would often be at very low wages and many times under a 
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(1) Worlds of Color, For. Aff., Vol.3, No.3. Apr . ,l925 . p.443. 
(2) Lewin, Op. cit., p.645. 
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native foreman. In the face of such conditions drastic legis-
lation may be expected. and yet it is no solution simply to 
push the colored man out and not provide for him in any other 
way. 
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We may ask what the agricultural condition of the 
natives is. Twelve per cent of the natives are town dwellers. 
When any of these return to their native villages they in-
variably find much of their land gone and they have not been 
taught how to use what they have left. But they do not give 
up. "They are, instead, intensely alive and are loudly clamor-
ing for land in a country where the average per head on the 
native reserves available f or occupation is in some cases as 
low as 4.8 acres (Transvaal and Orange Free State) and nowhere 
more than 12.8 acres (Cape) as compared with the enormous 
farms held by Europeans. It is estimated that in South Africa 
only 13 per cent of the l and is set aside for 4,500,000 
natives while 87 per cent is reserved for 1,500,000 whites. 
The questions of native reserves, coupled with the policy of 
racial and industrial segregation is the immediate problem 
that faces the Union Government today.n(l) 
Manifestly this is a very bad situation. A policy 
of segregation would do much to solve the whole problem but 
it would have to be a policy far different from the one now 
in practice. It would have to be one with equable rights and 
opportunities for both black and white, one in which the black 
man could develop his own social and political institutions 
(1) Lewin, Op. cit., pp. 645-46. 
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and his own industries, could get an education and have a 
chance to use it, could bring his standard of life up to that 
of the white man's. With these suggestions we turn to the 
last phase of our problem. 
3. The political ~spect. 
As long as the white man can hold tight the politic-
al reins of the country his position is pretty secure for he 
can then be fairly successful in imposing his will upon the 
rest of the population. But it is not certain as to how long 
he will be able to hold them in the Union. It has always 
been the policy of the Cape Frovince to grant the franchise 
to non-Europeans domiciled within its borders on the basis of 
the same small property qualification as the Europeans are 
req_uired to have. Now the situation is critical. "According 
to experts. in five years the natives in the Cape will out-
vote the Europeans, and in time the Cape members (of Parlia-
ment) would not dare openly to oppose an extension of the 
native vote . When that day came, the Northern Provinces 
would have to choose between breaking away from the Union, 
which could not be done without bloodshed , or submit to an 
extension of political rights to the natives.''(!) 
As is intimated by the above quotation non-Europeans 
seldom get the franchise in the other Provinces than the Cape. 
In the Union as a whole nine-tenths of the voters are Euro-
peans; there are 41,508 non-European vo ters all of which are 
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in the Cape save the 400 odd in Natal . In the Cape they formed 
(1) London Times, Nov. 14, 1925. p. 12, col . 6. 
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one-fifth of the electorat e in 1922 .(1) Thus the Cape situa-
tion forms the center of the native political problem. 
In view of these facts General Hertzog has drafted a 
native policy the main part of which he laid before the Union 
Parliament on June 2 , 1926. I t was not desired that action 
should be taken on his plan bef ore next year . The gist of the 
four Bills is as follows: 
a. The Parliamentary franchise shall be taken from 
the Cape natives . I n the place of this all the natives in the 
Union shall be given the franchise to elect seven European 
representatives to represent them in the Union Parliament. 
These seven men may not sit, speak, or vote when the question 
of native franchise or a motion of "no confidencen in the Gov-
ernment is being debated . 
b. Native Councils shall be formed to act along 
the lines of the native Councils which have grown out of the 
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Glen Grey Act of 1894 and which have worked so successfully in 
the Transkei.( 2 ) These would be largely advisory in character . 
c . Provision shall be made for the acquision of 
lands by the natives outside of native areas and the conference 
of certain rights of residence in the areas where they may not 
acquire land. 
d. The Cape Colored franchise shall be extended 
(1 ) Round Table, No. 49, Dec. , 1922. pp. 51-64. 
{ 2 ) For a concise and clear discussion of the Glen Grey Act 
and its application in the Transkei see Round Table, 
No. 12 , Sept., 1912. pp. 651-63. Space f orbids giving 
it here. 
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throughout the Union but for seven years those outside the Cape 
shall elect but one communal member. After this Parliament may 
extend their privileges . 
It is planned that t hese Bills will be debated in 
Parliament next year. Three of them will require a two-thirds 
majority of both Houses sitting together as they modify the 
Entrenched Clauses of the South Africa Act. It is the desire 
of all sane persons to keep .the question entirely out of party 
politics for it is plainly not a party issue. But considering 
the history of the Color Bar Bill it is doubtful if this will 
be done. That was a part of the Government's native policy 
and it had to be passed by a strict party vote und.er last 
resort conditions. This does not look good for keeping the 
same sort of action away from these other Bills. 
It is very probable that some such policy as that 
advanced by General Hertzog is the best that can be worked out 
for the Union. General Hertzog says: "I t is the policy of 
the Government in native territories that natives should be 
a llowed to undertake whatever kind of work they might -show 
themselves competent to do. They might be olerks, and eventu-
ally magistrates".(!) A policy of comple te segregation cannot 
be effected. The Majority Report of the Economic Wages Com-
missions was issued last February and it states that "the 
contact of the native and the European has lasted too long 
and their economic co-operation is too intimate and well es-
tablished for the exclusion of the native from European areas 
(1). London Times, Aug. 24, 1925. p. 9, col. 5 . 
and European industries". It also states that Europeans "have 
less to fear from the improvement than from the deterioration 
of the economic status of the native".(l) 
If properly administered, barring the effect of the 
Color Bar Bill, the Government native policy will work in th·is 
direction . It will gradually educate the natives to manage 
their own government and will bring them to the point where 
t hey will at last rightfully take their place beside , and then 
will supersede , the whi te man in South Af rica. For this is 
what must be expected. The Round Table states: "That which 
is now being endanger ed i n South Africa , and that which this 
generation has to save, is not so much the supremacy of the 
white man a s such, but the security of a civilized order , 
'white ' and Western in charac·ter , but containing, probably, 
many racial and colour elements in its personnel. The dange r 
all the time is of sa crificing civilization it~elf for the 
sake of a colour supremacy" • ( 2) 
Considering the present political condition of the 
country we do not know what will become of the present Gov-
ernment native policy but something definite will have to be 
done in the near future. Whatever this may be if it is suc-
cessful it must include within the working of it a revamping 
of the entire educational system of the Union so as to 
supply an adequate number of agricultural and industrial 
schools in which the natives may learn their trades. The 
(1) · London Times , Feb. 9, 1926. p. 13, col . 5. 
(2) No. 50 , Mar. , 1923. p. 439. 
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ordinary day schools must also be adapted to native needs. It 
must also include a fai r system of land tenure for the natives 
together with chances for industrial development at least 
within their reserves. And if it would be most successful 
then there is at least one more requirement. The spirit of 
Jesus Christ must permeate and control the formulation and 
administration of the whole plan. The native must be treated 
not as a mere animal , not as a slave, but as an end in him-
self , a~ capable of some day producing a civilization and 
culture which will have its rich gifts to lay at humanity's 
feet • 
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